CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF SCIENCE 219 



A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF SCIENCE 



By Professor WILHELM OSTWALD, 



UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG 



ONE of the few points on which the philosophy of to-day is agreed 

 consists in the realization that the only thing that is absolutely 

 certain and beyond doubt for every one is the content of his own con- 

 sciousness ; or rather not so much the content of consciousness in gen- 

 eral as merely the content of any given moment. 



This momentary content we divide into two great groups which we 

 assign to the inner and to the outer world, respectively. If we call a 

 single content of consciousness of any kind an experience, we refer such 

 experiences to the external world as take place without the participa- 

 tion of our own will and which can not be produced by it alone. Such 

 experiences come to us through the participation of certain parts of 

 our body, the sense-organs; the external world, in other words, is that 

 which reaches our consciousness through the senses. 



Conversely, we refer to our internal world all the experiences which 

 come to pass without the immediate help of our sense-apparatus. To 

 this class belong all the experiences which we designate as ' remember- 

 ing ' or ' thinking.' An accurate and complete differentiation of both 

 territories is at present not contemplated because it is not yet necessary. 

 It is a problem which is not capable of being attacked and solved until 

 later. For the present a general orientation in which every man may 

 recognize the familiar facts of his own consciousness is sufficient. 



Each and every experience has the property of being unique. None 

 of us doubts that the words of the poet : ' Everything in life repeats 

 itself/ strictly speaking, is the opposite of the truth, and that, as 

 a matter of fact, nothing in life repeats itself. In order, however, 

 to pronounce a judgment of this kind we must be in a position to com- 

 pare different experiences with one another; and the possibility of do- 

 ing so depends upon a fundamental phenomenon of our consciousness, 

 ' memory.' By virtue of memory alone, are we able to bring different 

 experiences into relation with one another, and thus make it possible 

 to propound at all the question concerning their likeness or difference. 

 The simpler relations are to be met with among internal experiences. 

 Any given thought, such as twice two are four, I am able to produce 

 in my consciousness as often as I choose; and, in addition to the con- 



1 Address before the Section of Methodology, Congress of Arts and Science, 

 St. Louis, translated by Dr. Carl. L. Alsberg. 



