236 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



which the public is confessedly the final arbiter. Moreover, since judi- 

 cial interpretation frequently either enlarges or contracts the meaning 

 of statutes and constitutions, the courts can hardly hope to escape with- 

 out criticism. And where the courts occasionally declare legislative acts 

 unconstitutional, as they do in the United States, popular criticism is 

 almost inevitable. There is as little reason to expect the courts to 

 escape unscathed by the sharp wing of criticism as to expect the soldier 

 on the firing line in time of battle to escape the risks to which he is 

 unavoidably exposed. It is useless to try to taboo the tendency of the 

 popular mind to criticize the judiciary. The only recourse for either 

 party to the controversy is to assume that the other is possessed of a 

 rational nature and to try to contradict error with truth. 

 In the oft-quoted words of Ex-President Taft : 



The opportunity freely and publicly to criticize judicial action is of vastly 

 more importance to the body politic than the immunity of courts and judges 

 from unjust aspersions and attack. Nothing tends more to render judges care- 

 ful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the con- 

 sciousness that every act of theirs is to be submitted to the intelligent scrutiny 

 and candid criticism of their fellow-men. In the case of judges having a life 

 tenure, indeed, their very independence makes the right freely to comment on 

 their decisions of greater importance, because it is the only practicable and 

 available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to 

 the reasonable demands of those they serve. 



These observations are especially true in a country where the springs 

 of authority are supposed to reside in and to issue from the people. In 

 a country where the divine right of kings is in vogue, there is a certain 

 consistency in placing popular criticism of the courts under the ban, 

 but such action is incongruous in a country committed to the idea of 

 popular rule. The courts are ordained and established by man to pro- 

 mote the ends of justice, and since the creature can not be greater than 

 its creator it is within the realm of the possible for the people to abridge 

 the power of the courts and to reconstitute them on a different basis. 

 The constitution leaves the establishment of courts inferior to the Su- 

 preme Court to the discretion of Congress. The original jurisdiction 

 of the Supreme Court is specifically limited to cases affecting ambassa- 

 dors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases in which a state is a 

 party, and its appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and 

 such regulations as Congress shall make. In providing for its own 

 amendment, moreover, the constitution makes no exception of the 

 judicial system for which it provided, but frankly admits that in this 

 as well as in other respects it may become outgrown and require modi- 

 fication. Certain current writers appear to think that the framers of 

 the constitution uttered the last word of wisdom upon the judiciary. 

 The framers themselves did not entertain this delusion. The last Ee- 

 publican platform recognizes that all is not well with the courts, and 

 accordingly favors legislation to the end of preventing " long delays and 



