250 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



multiplied social relations a new social creed is demanded. A social 

 philosophy that originated in the age of homespun does not fit the needs 

 of a factory age. 



There is no reason why the legal precedents adapted to conserving 

 the welfare of society amid the simple conditions of the past should 

 determine what is permissible amid the complex conditions of to-day. 



We can not regulate modern gas and electrical corporations by decisions 

 rendered in the days of the tallow dip; we can not adequately control four-track 

 steam railroads merely by the law of the stage-coach and the public inn; we 

 can not be content to have our labor legislation forever checked and thwarted 

 by the decisions of a few men out of the many, and those few, not men of to- 

 day, accountable in any way to their fellows, but dead men, who lived in the 

 days when manufacture was carried on only in wholesome towns and villages, on 

 a small scale and without modern "division of labor" — in fact, when few per- 

 sons even cared whether women worked long hours, or little children toiled in 

 mines, or workers breathed deadly fumes as they worked. ... Of course, if 

 we try to find in 1770 precedents to sustain 1912 legislation as to "sweat- 

 shops" or "underground bakeries" we shall not find any, for there were no 

 "sweat-shops" or "underground bakeries" then, and no one would have cared 

 or tried to pass laws about them then if there were.27 



To require the courts to decide questions of legislative policy neces- 

 sarily exposes them to attack, and few things would contribute more to 

 maintain their hold on the good-will of the public than to relieve them 

 from this responsibility. Either a more complete separation of legis- 

 lative and judicial functions is necessary, or the courts should be kept 

 better informed concerning the seasoned opinion of the community. 

 The opponents of "the recall of judicial decisions" should conse- 

 quently welcome any and every educational process that helps to keep 

 the courts informed and thoroughly in sympathy with the progressive 

 thought of the age. Well-intended criticism should not be frowned 

 upon, but encouraged. Along with everything else that is human, the 

 courts are likely to err, and criticism is the great corrective of judicial 

 as well as of other error. There is no good and sufficient reason why 

 substantially the same law should be held consistent with "the due 

 process" clause of the constitution of one state and inconsistent with 

 the same clause in the constitution of another state, especially when the 

 law is more urgently needed in the latter and when the Supreme Court 

 upholds its constitutionality. The unqualified manner in which a large 

 portion of the press denounced the clause on the judiciary in the demo- 

 cratic platform of 1896 was most unfortunate. The worst enemies of 

 the courts are those unqualifiedly opposed to calling them to account. 

 Such an attitude suggests that our judicial system will not stand the 

 light of criticism, tends to bring it under suspicion and to undermine 

 its authority. To dam up the free expression of grievances real or 

 imaginary forces people to nurse their wrongs, prevents the orderly 

 correction of injustice, and creates the conditions of a social con- 

 flagration. 



2~ William L. Ransom, op. tit., pp. 132-133. 



