THE SCIENCE IN HISTORY 493 



us ; there is no whole and completed development in the world's history ; 

 the beginning and the end are unknown ; the origin is shrouded in dark- 

 ness; before the future there hangs the veil of Mayo; we can observe 

 the pupa or cocoon, but not the caterpillar and moth. Under such 

 conditions every explanation must be subjective in character. 



Leaving then to one side the search for laws of social dynamics, the 

 historian contents himself with disclosing the causal relations of the 

 successive movements in the evolution of human society, and this is 

 the sole aim of history; but even here the science is subject to important 

 limitations for the use of experiment is impossible, so that the method 

 must be that of observation. At best many disadvantages confront the 

 observer, which are not encountered by the experimenter, so that his results 

 form a very insecure basis for induction, unless, as in other sciences, his 

 observations can be often repeated and the human senses aided by sensi- 

 tive instruments. But repetition and the use of instruments are not for the 

 historian, who works over the observations of the untrained minds of the 

 past. In seeking the cause or causes of any phenomenon the natural 

 scientist views it as a type of a large class ; and even in the case where 

 causation is determined by a single experiment, there always exist 

 numerous phenomena of the same kind or else the particular phenom- 

 enon offers itself to the possible repetition of the observation, so that 

 the assurance of the opportunity of repeating the test case plays an 

 important part in the induction. The scientist abstracts from the 

 occurrence all individual variations and finds the cause of the typical 

 phenomenon, which is generalized in thought so as to cover all indi- 

 viduals of like kind. Thus are obtained causal relations, which have 

 objective truth. Such a method of abstraction is inapplicable in his- 

 tory, for, as we have already seen, from the point of view of the historian 

 each phenomenon is exceptional and can not be classified to find types, 

 and also the same conditions and events never recur. 



In the search for causal relations how far is it possible to make use 

 of the canons of inductive logic ? On account of the reasons stated above 

 it is impossible to find two events which agree or disagree in all respects 

 except one. Therefore the canons of agreement and difference are of 

 no assistance in historical research. The impracticability of these 

 canons in history has always been acknowledged, and yet the literature 

 of history as well as of sociology and economics is filled with errors 

 arising from their unscientific use. 



Of the inductive canons there remain those of residue and of con- 

 comitant variations, neither of which is a very safe criterion of causal 

 relations and both of which can to a limited extent be employed by the 

 historian. When there are general propositions proved by other sci- 

 ences, such as psychology, sociology and economics, which will establish 

 the needed partial causation, the canon of residue can be used. The 

 value of such reasoning will depend on the reliability of the general 



