172 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



fact " from the chaos of ore before him, but also mint the coin of general 

 truths. 5 Indeed he is hopeful of deriving a sound generalization even 

 from a mass of particular facts some of which are doubtful. He recog- 

 nizes further that to accomplish this is no simple matter, as when, for 

 instance, he says that the evaluation of the relative worth of the facts is a 

 problem " delicate et sujette a mille causes d'erreurs." But it is also 

 in his opinion a problem where " rules are insufficient " and where 

 individual genius is called for, where sometimes "even a sort of intui- 

 tion penetrates further than study and reflection." G 



That is that divination of which Winsor spoke — a feeling-it-in-one's 

 bones method. History written thus would be more like a feat of 

 magic than the work of science. To identify historian and magician 

 is of course absurd, yet it must be said that a certain mystery envelop- 

 ing the labors of the historian lends further color to the fancy. The 

 historian has too much the air of entering a holy of holies of the 

 sources where none but he dare tread and whence he will in due time 

 emerge bearing precious secrets from beyond the veil. Bather cab- 

 balistic footnotes make the mystery the more esoteric. He judges the 

 past not in open court with the evidance made public, the press ad- 

 mitted, a jury hearing all the facts and then rendering its verdict, but 

 in secret inquisition where he alone is both advocate and judge — and 

 sometimes torturer. Another historian may retry the case if he wish, 

 but will need to start again almost from the beginning. So sixteenth 

 century mathematicians published their new formulas but kept from 

 the world the processes by which they had been attained. Only there is 

 the difference that those formulas justified themselves in use; the his- 

 torian's results must be taken entirely on faith. Of course the consci- 

 entious historian of to-day has no desire to cover his tracks, he makes 

 by bibliography and references an endeavor to indicate them to the 

 reader, but he seems to despair of a complete scientific exposition of 

 his labors. Yet even if he can not always hit the truth, even if history 

 has no scientific laws, surely his thought about history can give an 

 account of itself. Surely, too, its methods must be ones of which it can 

 give an account. 



Monod, to do him justice, to some extent realizes the former possi- 

 bility if not the latter requirement. He finally gives three "general 

 rules" of historical presentation. First, the sources used by the his- 

 torian should be indicated; second, proof of his statements should be 

 furnished as far as possible; third, he should sharply distinguish those 

 points of which he feels sure from those which are more or less un- 

 certain. These rules, vague in their wording and inadequate in their 

 scope, are a faithful reflection of the present unsatisfactory and in- 

 definite status of historical presentation. " Indicate " the sources : — 



6 The metaphor is mine, not Monod's. 

 "Ibid., p. 489. 



