178 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



escape that frequent failing of German scholarship — the squandering 

 of Herculean labor in the compilation of specific details, " facts/' in 

 other words, upon an inadequate conception of the general bearings of 

 the subject. There comes to mind a " standard " work upon the human- 

 ism of the Eenaissance, a book cited among the best in bibliographies. 

 It consists almost entirely of a series of little essays on various human- 

 ists, containing very miscellaneous information and tacked together by 

 artificial literary transitions. One might take a large sheet of paper, 

 write the names of the humanists in a vertical column, set against these 

 in succeeding columns such points as date of birth and death, parent- 

 age, patrons, pupils, chief writings, purity of Latinity, knowledge of 

 Greek, religious attitude, and have before one not merely the whole 

 volume but more, since now one would be in a better position to grasp 

 the subject as a whole and see to some slight extent how individuals 

 worked together to make a movement 



The scientific historian will see not only that his theme must be 

 developed systematically, but also that every concept which may be im- 

 plicated in his investigation must be sharply defined and henceforth 

 consistently treated from that one point of view. The field must be 

 fenced in, if any truth is to be corralled. If one is trying to bring out 

 characteristics of a given period of time, evidently one must limit one- 

 self to it. If a " movement " or an institution is concerned, it should 

 be as exactly defined as possible in terms of those phenomena, qualities, 

 and tendencies which are peculiar to it. Thus its gradual beginning, 

 height and fading may be adequately recognized and discriminated 

 from each other and from events contemporary but unconnected with 

 either. Indeed, the historian who has denied the existence of " facts " 

 will be inclined to look askance also at periods, movements and insti- 

 tutions. He will shake himself free from unjustifiable historical con- 

 glomerates as well as from false historical units. We shall get from 

 his pen no dreary historical miscellanies, no omnibus biographies. He 

 will be trying to prove something and will assume nothing. 



While then the scientific historian will sharply define every concept 

 and field, he will not make the mistake of thinking that some portion 

 of the historical field can be fenced off and studied by itself, as investi- 

 gators of periods and places too often do now. In history's continuity 

 and complexity not only have particulars no reality, but generalizations 

 have no truth unless followed through the whole stream. They may 

 take on a different significance when brought into contact with other 

 truths. Historical measurements have relative rather than absolute 

 value. They must be in more than one dimension. Is this asking too 

 much ? Must the historical investigator know everything before he 

 can find out anything ? Not if he does not attempt to discover too much 

 or to measure that which has too many relations — as does a period. 

 Not if he takes a problem sufficiently precise and limited to be covered, 

 as it should be, by considering everything that is likely to have any 



