MR. BALFOUR'S DIALECTICS. 331 



due consideration we shall have to admit, I think, that it does 

 not." And he then proceeds to argue that the proposition is 

 doubtful, or indeed untrue, because I hold that certain elements 

 of it matter, space, time and force are, when fundamentally- 

 considered, incomprehensible. Now this, which at first sight ap- 

 pears to be simply a vicarious skepticism, proves, on inquiry, to 

 be a skepticism of Mr. Balfour himself. For since, as shown on 

 p. 284, he holds the same view that I do respecting these " ulti- 

 mate scientific ideas/' what he calls my principles are, in this 

 region, 7m principles. So that, making the substitution, the sen- 

 tence should run : " But then, on my principles, does the sun 

 give light ? " The statement that the sun gives light is in his 

 view not a certainty but the contrary. 



Turn now to Mr. Balfour's converse attitude. As a result of 

 economies of belief, like the foregoing, he is able to regard as 

 necessary certain assumptions which seem to me to have no war- 

 rant. The following passages from p. 302 supply an example : 



" The ordered system of phenomena asks for a cause; our knowledge of 

 that system is inexplicable unless we assume for it a rational Author. . . . 



" We can not, for example, form, I will not say any adequate, but even 

 any tolerable, idea of the mode in which God is related to, and acts on, the 

 world of phenomena. That He created it, that He sustains it, we are driven 

 to believe. How He created it, how He sustains it, it is impossible for us 

 to imagine." 



Here, then, is implied the belief, apparently regarded as unquestion- 

 able, that while one ultimate difficulty can not be allowed to re- 

 main without solution, another may be allowed so to remain. But 

 why, if it must continue " impossible for us to imagine " the mode 

 of operation of the cause behind " the ordered system of phenome- 

 na," may it not continue "impossible for us to imagine" the 

 nature of that cause ? If we are obliged to assume the cause to 

 be " a rational Author," since otherwise our knowledge of " the 

 ordered system of phenomena is inexplicable," why must we not 

 assume a certain mode of action by which " He created " and 

 " sustains "" the ordered system of phenomena," since otherwise 

 the creation and sustentation of it are inexplicable ? To me it 

 seems an indefensible belief that while for one part of the Mys- 

 tery of Things we must assign an explanation, all other parts may 

 be left without explanation. If the constitution of matter defies 

 all attempts to understand it, if it is impossible to understand in 

 what way feeling is connected with nervous change, if wherever 

 we analyze our knowledge to the bottom we come down to un- 

 analyzable components which elude the grasp of thought, what 

 ground is there for the belief that of one part of the mystery, 

 and that the deepest part, we must and can reach an explana- 

 tion ? Surely there is a strange incongruity in holding that we 



