332 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



have here a certainty while denying to be certain that the sun 

 gives light. 



A considerable portion of The Foundations of Belief is occu- 

 pied by a discussion of the relative claims of Reason and Au- 

 thority. Certainly, in whatever other ways Mr. Balfour's argu- 

 ment tends to discredit Reason, it does not here discredit it by 

 example; for in general and in detail it is in this case charac- 

 terized by philosophic grasp, clear discrimination, and unusual 

 lucidity of statement. But while agreeing with him in his esti- 

 mate of the relative shares of Authority and Reason in determin- 

 ing our beliefs, and while holding as he does that life would be 

 impossible if all our beliefs had to be formed by Reason without 

 the aid of Authority, I would emphasize the fact of which he is 

 himself conscious, that it is impossible to go completely behind 

 Reason ; for if any other ruler is raised to the throne, in part or 

 for a time, it is by Reason that this is done. Reason can not be 

 essentially discredited by Reason : the attempt ends in suicide. 

 In one case only that, namely, in which the question is between 

 the verdicts of Reason and those of simple Perception, chiefly of 

 objective existence may Reason, estimating its own powers, vol- 

 untarily abdicate ; since critical examination of its processes shows 

 that it can not take even a first step toward discrediting the in- 

 tuitions which yield the consciousness of external existence with- 

 out tacitly positing these intuitions as data, and connoting the co- 

 existence of subject and object by all the words it uses;* and 

 that, consequently, all it can do in this sphere is to explain incon- 

 gruities so as to harmonize these intuitions with one another and 

 with itself. But while this limitation holds where the opposition 

 is between mediate and immediate knowledge, it does not hold 

 where the opposition is between two kinds of mediate knowledge 

 the verdicts of Reason and those of Authority. Hence, in esti- 

 mating the relative claims of Reason and Authority we have to 

 bear in mind that the supremacy of Reason is exercised in the act 

 of choosing the Authority. How, exercising this supremacy, does 

 it make the choice ? Clearly by comparing the degrees of trust- 

 worthiness of authorities as ascertained in experience. That we 

 do this when the authorities are individual men is undeniable. 

 We ask how often their respective statements have been verified, 

 and how often the guidance they have severally yielded has 

 proved good. If, looking back, we see that the statements made 

 by the one have habitually corresponded with facts, and that the 

 advice given by him has been shown by the result to be wise, 

 while many statements of the other have been disproved at the 



* Principles of Psychology, 388-412. 



