376 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



morning. Of the rest of the jury, one was a blacksmith and two 

 were mechanics, all steady workers ; one was a horse trader, one 

 a groceryman. one a retired farmer and trader, and the last man 

 was an ex-railroad man who had no business. Every one of this 

 jury was accustomed to be in the open air, and had not read 

 details of the case, although he had heard it talked over. Not 

 one of these men would have been chosen to take charge of any 

 trust, or to decide on any matter outside of his everyday life 

 simply because, on general principles and from common-sense 

 observation, he would have been considered clearly incompetent. 



For ten days this jury was confined from five to six hours a 

 day, listening to the testimony of the mental capacity and motives 

 of the maker of a will that was disputed. Of course, they disa- 

 greed ; and had they reached a unanimous verdict, its wisdom 

 and justice would have been a matter of accident. 



In a celebrated case tried in an interior town in New York, 

 a most complicated chain of circumstantial evidence, involving 

 the questions of concealed motives of unusual acts and conduct, 

 of blood-stains, of the accuracy of chemical and microscopical 

 work, of different opinions of competent men, was submitted to a 

 jury of the following persons: one carpenter, one wagon-maker, 

 three coopers, two farmers, one groceryman, one contractor, and 

 three nurserymen. These men all testified that they had not 

 formed an opinion on the case, although it had been town talk 

 for months. Not one of them could naturally have given an in- 

 telligent opinion on any of the issues of the case, even if they had 

 been presented in the most impartial, simple manner by the judge. 

 When two opposite views were urged by opposing counsel, in 

 an adroit partisan manner, the most uncertain mental confusion 

 would be inevitable. 



This particular jury was not only incompetent naturally and 

 by want of training to discriminate facts that were unfamiliar, 

 but its members were unaccustomed to consider any range of 

 facts compared with others to determine which were true. 



In a third celebrated case, a jury composed of four fishermen, 

 two shipbuilders, two stonecutters, one clerk, two merchants, and 

 two persons of no business, was asked to decide on the facts of 

 one of the most mysterious cases of poisoning. A number of 

 expert witnesses and shrewd lawyers extended this case two 

 weeks, and gathered a mass of statements that only the most 

 astute judge could have disentangled. These jurymen were not 

 only bewildered, but were mentally palsied by the appeals of 

 counsel. 



The methods of selecting jurors are thus literally open doors 

 for the defeat of the very purposes of justice. The ostensible 

 purpose in the selection of a jury is to secure men of honesty, 



