442 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



The gap between theory and practice comes out also in the great 

 reliance placed upon religious motives in the moral life. It is not 

 necessary to enter into controversial questions here. The fact is 

 enough that contemporary moralists, almost without exception 

 and including all schools, hold that the reasons and duties of the 

 moral life either lie within itself, or at least may be stated by 

 themselves without direct reference to supernatural considerations. 

 In running over the names of moral theorists of the present day, 

 of all schools, I can think of but two exceptions to this statement. 

 Sidgwick holds that it iniay be impossible to get a jinoX statement 

 of morals without postulating a supreme moral Being and Ruler, 

 while Martineau holds that obligation is derived from such a Be- 

 ing. But even Martineau holds that the fads of obligation may 

 be found directly in human nature ; that it is only when we de- 

 mand a philosophical explanation of its nature that we bring in 

 the reference to God. Either, then, theory is working in a very 

 unpractical direction, or else much of practice is going on in very 

 anti-scientific fashion. A readjustment is demanded. 



This brings me to my final point. An influential movement of 

 the present times (I refer to the ethical culture movement) holds, 

 as I understand it, that it is possible to separate the whole matter 

 of the moral education of children and adults from theoretical 

 considerations. With their contention that education can be 

 (must be, I should say) separated from dogmatic theories I am 

 heartily at one ; but as, after all, a dogmatic theory is a contra- 

 diction in terms, the question is, whether such an emancipation 

 can be effected without a positive theory of the moral life. It is 

 a critical and practical question with every teacher and parent : 

 What reasons shall I present to my child for doing this right 

 act ? What motives in him shall I appeal to in order that he 

 may realize for himself that it is right ? What interests in him 

 shall I endeavor to evoke in order to create an habitual disposition 

 in this right direction ? I fail utterly to see how these questions 

 can be even approximately answered without some sort of a work- 

 ing theory. To give a reason to a child, to suggest to him a mo- 

 tive I care not what for doing the right thing, is to have and 

 use a moral theory. To point out its consequences to himself in 

 the ways of pains and pleasures ; to point out its reaction into his 

 own habits and character ; to show him how it affects the welfare 

 of others ; to point out what strained and abnormal relations it 

 sets up between him and others, and the reaction of these relations 

 upon his own happiness and future actions to point to any of 

 these things with a view to instilling moral judgment and dis- 

 position is to appeal to a theory of the moral life. To suppose 

 that the appeal to do a thing simply because it is right does not 

 involve such a theory ; to suppose that the practical value of this 



