TEE CAREER OF HERBERT SPENCER 13 



in his attacks on Comte's serial classification of the sciences he denies 

 that there is any serial order.^* But whenever he mentions the sub- 

 jects of his " Synthetic Philosophy " he always arranges them in the 

 same order,^^ corresponding to that of his original program and of all 

 subsequent programs. No one will probably question the propriety of 

 this arrangement, and it may be inferred that he regarded psychology 

 as having some such relation to biology as the latter has to chemistry, 

 i. e., as in a sense growing out of it. Now, whereas he does clearly show 

 this filiation of biology and chemistry, it is difficult to find in his 

 psychology a recognition of its dependence upon biology in the same 

 sense. This is probably due to the fact that the " Psychology " was 

 first written and published as an independent work several years before 

 he conceived the idea of a " Synthetic Philosophy," and afterward 

 revised, enlarged, and adapted, and then set up in its proper niche 

 in the general structure. But the task of adapting it was not an easy 

 one, and he seems to have devoted himself more to what he regarded 

 as its improvement, to the answering of criticisms, and to bringing it 

 up to date, than to linking it on to his " Biology " which stands before 

 it, and to his " Sociology," which was to follow. 



He wrote the " Psychology " when fresh from the reading of 

 Hamilton, Mansel, Mill and Kant, and the point of view was that of 

 the old philosophy of mind, which he, indeed, attacked, but scarcely 

 from the modern scientific point of view. This is more true of the 

 second volume than of the first. The work opens, as do most works 

 on psychology, with a treatise on the nervous system, and the chapter 

 on ^stho-physiology is certainly luminous and forms a new departure. 

 His definition of mind as consisting of feelings and the relations be- 

 tween feelings is inexpugnable. In part III. he treats of life and mind 

 as " correspondence," but does not seem to regard mind as an outgrowth 

 of life. In treating pleasures and pains at the end of part II, he 

 recognizes the existence of feelings which do not consist of pleasure or 

 pain, and even calls them " indifferent," but he does not there or 

 elsewhere show that the function of such feelings is to furnish knowl- 

 edge. This was perceived by Eeid, though he did not grasp its import. 

 Spencer thus fails to show the genesis of the rational powers. He 

 clearly sets forth the biologic origin of feeling, but he does not perceive 

 that the intellect was also an advantageous attribute whose origin can 

 be explained on natural principles. Notwithstanding the acknowledged 

 ability of this work, these and other deficiencies deprive it of the title 

 given it by some of being Mr. Spencer^s chef d'oeuvre. Standing as 

 it does between the " Biology " and the " Sociology," with neither of 



""Life and Letters," Vol. I., p. 97; "Pure Sociology," p. 66 (this part 

 of his letter is omitted in the " Life and Letters," Vol. II., p. 90. 

 « " Life and Letters," Vol. II., pp. 285, 328. 



