LITERARY NOTICES. 



131 



been invariably associated, while corruption 

 and tenure dependent upon political suc- 

 cess have always gone along together. 



Sweeping as is the indictment of party, 

 its methods and results, its substantial accu- 

 racy will be questioned by few conversant 

 with the facts. The evil is allowed, but the 

 means of remedying it are not clear. To 

 many it has seemed that there is no cure. 

 Mr. Stickney is not of this number. His 

 showing of the causes upon which the evil 

 depends has revealed to him the method 

 of eliminating it. The public does not get 

 its best men in the public employ, or get 

 from its servants their best work, because 

 the best men will not condescend to the 

 work necessary to enter and remain in the 

 public service, and because they have not 

 security in their position during " good be- 

 havior." In the callings of private life men 

 have the assurance that, if they do their 

 work well, they will have employment for 

 life. They have also the assurance that, if 

 they do it ill, they will lose their employ- 

 ment. They are therefore under constant 

 pressure to do their work well. Mr. Stick- 

 ney believes that these conditions can be 

 realized in the public service by the changes 

 in our political system which he advocates. 

 These changes consist in abolishing the term 

 system, in so arranging the control of ap- 

 pointment and dismissal from office that 

 there shall be direct responsibility for the 

 performance of the work of the various 

 departments, and in reducing the number 

 of elective offices to the lowest point. To 

 this end the President is elected as now, 

 not for any definite term, but to continue in 

 office so long as he performs his duties 

 well. He has absolute control over the ap- 

 pointment and dismissal of the heads of de- 

 partments. These heads have in turn the 

 same power over their subordinates, and are 

 responsible to the Chief Executive alone for 

 the work of their departments. And so 

 down through the entire service, each em- 

 ployee being responsible to his immediate 

 superior for the faithful performance of his 

 duties, and being assured of his place only 

 so long as they are well done. To secure 

 efficiency, each man must have work of only 

 one kind. The Chief Executive is given 

 no voice, as now, in legislation, his veto- 

 power being taken from him. He is re- 



sponsible for the work of the entire Ex- 

 ecutive branch of the Government to the 

 National Assembly. Mr. Stickney favors 

 only one body, of four or five hundred 

 men, instead of the two we now have ; but, 

 if there be two, it is sitting as one body 

 that they form the Assembly to whom the 

 Executive is responsible. The Executive 

 may be at any time removed for any cause 

 by a two-thirds vote of this Assembly. The 

 Assembly has no voice in the choice of a 

 new Executive. The senior department offi- 

 cer is made President pro tern, pending the 

 election of a new President. The members 

 of the Legislature are elected, like the Pres- 

 ident, for no definite term. They can be 

 turned out of office by a two-thirds vote of 

 the Assembly of which they are members. 

 The judges are also made elective, but for 

 no definite time. These are the only elec- 

 tive offices, in the national. State, and city 

 governments. All the others are by ap- 

 pointment. Under this system the power 

 of party as now existing would be destroyed, 

 Mr. Stickney holds, because there would be 

 few offices to be captured by election work, 

 and, the tenure being dependent upon good 

 behavior, it would be impossible to deter- 

 mine when these few would be vacant. The 

 office-seeker would then disappear, because 

 the profession could no longer pay. And 

 the office-seeker as a distinct class having 

 disappeared, public servants would become 

 as efficient and as honest as those in private 

 life. The whole of Mr. Stickney's scheme 

 turns upon this point the breaking up of 

 party organization by removing the oppor- 

 tunities of profit which keep it intact. 



It seems to us that it is just here that the 

 scheme fails. The power of party man- 

 agers is dependent not upon themselves 

 alone, but upon the following they can com- 

 mand. And they can command this fol- 

 lowing in virtue of the intensity of party 

 feeling. It is because there are multitudes 

 of men who can be rallied by the party cry 

 to support it through thick and thin that 

 the managers are able to prostitute the ser- 

 vices of the Government to their own ends. 

 The diminishing of the elective offices not 

 only would not reduce this partisan feel- 

 ing, but would have no tendency to do so. 

 These elective offices are, moreover, but a 

 part of those of the Government. The 



