CRITICISMS CORRECTED. 389 



we produce changes, is the correlative of that universal power which 

 transcends consciousness. And then he ends the criticisms forming 

 the second part of his work by saying, " If this is not materialistic I do 

 not know what is." He does not do this by inadvertence, though there 

 would be little excuse even then ; but he does it deliberately and with 

 his eyes open. His next chapter begins : 



"It will have been observed that in the preceding part of this 

 criticism I have employed the term 'matter in motion,' and have 

 avoided the use of the word 'force,' although it appears so promi- 

 nently in the pages of Mr. Spencer's work. This has not been acci- 

 dental, but by design, indicating as it does one of my main criticisms 

 of Mr. Spencer. 



" I can logically take up one of two positions. The first recognizes 

 matter, whose properties are merely those of extension, which are ca- 

 pable of being described in terms of geometry and arithmetic. I can 

 also recognize as the sole active properties of matter its modes and 

 rates of motion the motion, that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms, 

 molecules, or masses, also capable of measurement. 



" The second position recognizes matter and its activity or activi- 

 ties matter as endowed with force or forces." 



Thus it will be observed that having avowedly dealt with matter 

 and motion as modes of force, I am " by design " criticised as though 

 I had not so dealt with them. Having distinctly said what I mean by 

 matter and motion, I am practically told that I shall not mean that, 

 but shall mean what Mr. Guthrie means ; and shall be dealt with ac- 

 cordingly. And then, further, it will be observed that of the two posi- 

 tions which Mr. Guthrie lays down as possible, and proceeds to argue 

 upon as alternatives, one or other of which I must accept, both speak 

 of matter and units of matter as though actually existing under the 

 forms thought by us ; and the last, speaking of " matter as endowed 

 with force or forces," implies that whether in mass or in units, matter 

 is a space-occupying something which is in the one case inert and in the 

 other case made active by force with which it is " endowed " force 

 which is added to the inert something. Spite of all the pains I have 

 taken to show that I regard matter as itself a localized manifestation 

 of force spite of all the evidence that our idea of a unit of matter, or 

 atom, is regarded by me simply as a symbol which the form of our 

 thought obliges us to use, but which we can not suppose answers to 

 the reality without committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities 

 of thought, I am debited with the belief that matter actually consists 

 "of space-occupying units, having shape and measurement." Though 

 I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of matter, motion, and 

 force are but the x, y, and z with which we work our equations, and 

 formulate the various relations among phenomena in such way as to 

 express their order in terms of cc, y, and z though I have shown that 

 the realities for which x, y, and 2 stand can not be conceived by us as 



