SOCIAL EVOLUTION. 609 



to test Mr. Spencer's doctrine. Thus there cannot be much doubt that 

 certain nations have, during certain centuries of their history, made 

 rather rapid progress in civilization, but have afterward suffered an 

 arrest, which has, in some instances, been followed by temporary or 

 permanent decline ; while, on the other hand, others, and these by far 

 the more numerous, have continued for thousands of years in a condi- 

 tion almost, if not altogether, stationary. In his work on " Ancient 

 Law," Sir H. Maine does not hesitate to say that 



" The stationary condition of the human race is the rule; the progressive, 

 the exception."' " In spite of overwhelming evidence," he remarks, " it is most 

 difficult for a citizen of Western Europe to hring thoroughly home to himself the 

 truth that the civilization which surrounds him is a rare exception in the history 

 of the world. ... It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has 

 never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved, 

 since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by their 

 embodiment in some permanent record." 



Again, it is a point upon which, I suppose, it may be said, histori- 

 ans are agreed, that, even in Europe for many centuries starting, 

 let us say, from the age of the Antonines, and ending with the elev- 

 enth or twelfth century the movement in human affairs was on the 

 whole steadily backward; the state of things existing at the latter 

 date being 1 , according- to all the main tests of human well-being, far in 



o? 7 



arrear of the condition attained in the former epoch. It may be that 

 these generalizations are superficial, that the learning of the world is 

 here at fault, and that history better understood would support Mr. 

 Spencer's view ; or it may be that the current beliefs on the points in 

 question are capable of being reconciled with the new doctrine. Be 

 this as it may, it is not the less true that the verdict of history, as now 

 understood by its most competent interpreters, is distinctly opposed to 

 the theory of social evolution enunciated by Mr. Spencer. Now, this is a 

 fact which has been completely ignored by that distinguished writer; he 

 has simply passed it by as not concerning his argument ; and in doing 

 so has, as I contend, set at naught one of the best-understood canons 

 of the inductive method the canon that requires that hypotheses, be- 

 fore being accepted as laws of Nature, or made the bases of confident 

 deduction, should be carefully verified by comparison with all avail- 

 able facts pertinent to the question in hand. M. Comte, who, as 

 regards the particular point under consideration the necessarily pro- 

 gressive character of human evolution is at one with Mr. Spencer, 

 understood otherwise the claims of the positive philosophy, and does, 

 in fact, fairly attempt to grapple with the historical difficulties to which 

 I have referred. It is true, indeed, his argument is by no means suc- 

 cessful at least so it seems to me in establishing the required con- 

 clusion ; but it is, at least, more satisfactory than total silence. 



It follows, then, that Mr. Spencer's theory of social evolution can 

 only be regarded, as matters now stand, as an unverified hypothesis, 



VOL. VI. 39 



