332 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



telleetual progress, this is equally the law of emotional progress. 

 The emotions are compounded out of simple feelings, or rather out of 

 the ideas of them ; the higher emotions are compounded out of the 

 lower emotious ; and thus there is progressing integration. For the 

 same reason there is progressing complexity : each larger consolidated 

 aggregate of ideal feelings contains more varied, as well as more nu- 

 merous, clusters of components. The extension of the correspondence 

 in Space, too, though lest manifest, may still be asserted : witness the 

 difference between the proprietary feeling in the savage, responding 

 only to a few material objects adjacent to him weapons, decorations, 

 food, place of shelter, etc. and the proprietary feeling in the civil- 

 ized man, who owns land in Canada, shares in an Australian mine, 

 Egyptian stock, and mortgage-bonds on an Indian railway. And, that 

 the extension of the correspondence in Time may be asserted of the 

 more evolved emotions will be manifest, on remembering how the 

 sentiment of possession is gratified by acts of which the fruition can 

 come only after many years, and even gets pleasure from an ideal 

 power over bequeathed property ; and on remembering how the sen- 

 timent of justice seeks satisfaction in reforms that are to benefit future 

 generations. 



As pointed out in a later division of the " Principles of Psychol- 

 ogy," a more special measure of mental development is the degree of 

 representativeness in the states of consciousness. Cognitions and 

 feelings were both classified in the ascending order of presentative, 

 preseutative - representative, representative, and re - representative. 

 This general order has been necessary ; since there must have been 

 presentation before representation, and representation before re-repre- 

 sentation. It was shown, too, that this more special standard har- 

 monizes with the more general standard ; since increasing representa- 

 tiveness in the states of consciousness is shown by the more extensive 

 integrations of ideas, by the greater definiteness with which they are 

 represented, by the greater complexity of the integrated groups, as 

 well as by the greater heterogeneity among their elements ; and here 

 it may be added that greater representativeness is also shown by the 

 greater distances in space and time to which the representations ex- 

 tend. 



There is a further measure which may be serviceably used along 

 with the other two. As was shown in the "Principles of Psychology : " 



" Mental evolution, both intellectual and emotional, may be measured by the 

 degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action. The formation of sudden, 

 irreversible conclusions on the slenderest evidence is less distant from reflex 

 action than is the formation of deliberate and modifiable conclusions after much 

 evidence has been collected. And similarly, the quick passage of simple emo- 

 tions into the particular kinds of conduct they prompt is less distant from reflex 

 action than is the comparatively-hesitating passage of compound emotions into 

 kinds of conduct determined by the joint instigation of their components." 



