ANIMALS NOT AUTOMATA. 407 



tions, sensations, and emotions, our consciousness is conclusive evi- 

 dence that we have them, and that they are what consciousness repre- 

 sents them to be. The consciousness of the sensation of pain is the 

 pain itself; and the consciousness of perceiving that the whole is 

 greater than its part is, itself, the perception of that fact, and there 

 can be no question as to my actually having the sensation of pain, or 

 as to my having the perception of the inequality. But the conscious- 

 ness is not conclusive as to the conformity of the perception with the 

 existing fact, nor as to any inference which I may draw from the sen- 

 sation. One may have as full and decided perception of what is not, 

 as of what is ; and the liability to erroneous inferences from our sensa- 

 tions is a matter of daily experience. 



Even a universal belief, founded on entire uniformity in the per- 

 ceptions, or in the inferences from our sensations, is not conclusive. 

 ' If it were, no error in such belief could ever be corrected. If, for in- 

 stance, the belief that the sun daily revolved around the earth was 

 once universal and universal belief is regarded as conclusive the 

 present belief never could have been substituted. Still, to assume 

 things to be as they appear to be, till a sufficient reason is given to 

 the contrary, is a necessary condition to our progress in science and 

 philosophy. If this proposition is denied, then all Prof. Huxley's 

 array of facts and arguments may be fairly met by saying, "True, these 

 things appear to be as you say, but, then, this appearing is no reason 

 for supposing that they really are so." There would be an end to at 

 least all physical investigations. 



Instinct is, perhaps, a more important element in this discussion 

 than Prof. Huxley has suggested the various and vague notions in 

 regard to it which obtain both in the popular and philosophical mind 

 do much to confuse the consideration of voluntary and mechanical 

 action. 



Prof. Huxley assumes that instinctive action is mechanical. He 

 says : " When we talk of the lower animals being provided with in- 

 stinct, and not with reason, what we really mean is that, although 

 they are sensitive, and although they are conscious, yet they act me- 

 chanically, and that their different states of consciousness, their sensa 

 tions, their thoughts (if they have any), their volitions (if they have 

 any), are the products and consequences of their mechanical arrange- 

 ments. I must confess that this popular view is, to my mind, the only 

 one which can be scientifically adopted." 



There is much and high authority for the doctrine that instinctive 

 actions are mechanical, but I believe it is very generally rejected by 

 those who have observed the actions of animals without any knowl- 

 edge of subtile theories to account for them. " What," incredulously 

 exclaimed one of my grandchildren, on hearing of "Prof. Huxley's 

 statement," " what sort of a mechanism is it that carries the wild-geese 

 from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico every fall, and brings them back 



