414 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



when we make none, though I see no reason why such a circuitous 

 mode of action should be adopted. But, though the consciousness of 

 making an effort is not conclusive as to the actual making, still, as it is 

 of internal phenomena, it is evidence of a higher order than that 

 which consciousness of a sensation gives as to the existence or char- 

 acter of the external phenomena. 



The senses through which the external is presented may not act 

 perfectly ; and this, as compared with the consciousness of internal 

 phenomena, makes an additional risk of error similar to that which 

 arises from seeing an object through glass or in the reflection of a 

 mirror, instead of directly without any intervening medium. 



Those, then, who set up physical phenomena against our conscious 

 ness of effort, labor under the disadvantage of impeaching the accu- 

 racy of the testimony by other testimony which is less reliable than 

 that which they impeach. 



Prof. Huxley admits that men and other animals know and feel. 

 The existence, then, of that for which power by effort is claimed as 

 an attribute, with these prerequisites to its exercise, is admitted. 



On the other hand, any belief in matter or in its motion is but an 

 inference from our sensations which, as we have seen, is not a neces- 

 sary or conclusive inference ; and hence we have no reliable evidence 

 of the existence of matter, nor of the attributes which, if it exists, are 

 essential to its having power. 



In the first case, we know the existence of the active agent ; its 

 feeling, subjecting it to want ; and its knowledge, enabling it to adopt 

 a mode of gratifying its want, which are all the elements which are 

 requisite to the exercise of a power by effort, and though we have no 

 conclusive proof that it actually makes the effort, the testimony in 

 regard to this, for reasons already stated, is more reliable than the 

 inferences from our sensations, that matter exists, and that it moves, 

 and that one portion impinges on another portion, all of which are es- 

 sential to material causation. In the first case, the existence of the 

 agent, with all the prerequisites to the exercise of power, is known. 

 In the latter, not a single one of them is known. This shows that the 

 material phenomena which Prof. Huxley presents are not, in this case, 

 sufficient to rebut the testimony of consciousness that we do will do 

 make effort, and thereby produce change. 



The further question, Do we ourselves determine our efforts ? is 

 identical with that of our freedom in willing, which I do not propose 

 here to discuss, but will remark that it is not probable, perhaps it is 

 not conceivable, that any unintelligent agent should create the whole 

 system of wants, knowledge, and the application of knowledge in- 

 volved in an effort, as just stated, and impress the whole as illusions 

 on the mind of the actor; nor yet, that any blind force should direct 

 the effort in exact conformity to the wishes and the preconceptions of 

 the manner and the effect which are in the thoughts of him who has 



