6 , T/ie Scottish Naturalist. 



be under all the possible rubrics that can be needed to chapter 

 off the faculties of the human mind, and then conclude with an 

 easy and uncritical proclamation that these facts, manifesting 

 intelligent powers, moral feelings, and religious instincts, there- 

 fore show an identity in kind between the animal and human 

 soul, — if that shall be the full tale of the work of the coming 

 book, and so long as it shall be the full tale of the achievements 

 of any number of coming books, then and so long the adequate 

 book on the animal soul, with the adequate conclusions at least 

 initiated, we shall still have sine die to wait and wish for. 



With respect, farther, to the common oversight of uncon- 

 scious mental operation, even Dr. Carpenter, who has done so 

 much to direct attention to the automatic action of intelligence, 

 does not seem always to give sufficient room, or to do full 

 justice to the fact. I cannot tind even entire consistency in 

 his utterances. It is hardly possible to conclude whether he holds 

 his sensori-motor action to be conscious or unconscious. He 

 plainly hesitates to allow of unconscious, or automatic sensi- 

 bility. Thus, (Mental Physiology, p. 148), He says, "Sensa- 

 tion is that primary change in the condition of the conscious 

 Ego, which results from some change in the condition of the 

 Non-ego or external world." And he adds, in a note, "Some 

 physiologists, it is true, have spoken of sensation without con- 

 sciousness; but it seems very desirable, for the sake of clearness 

 and accuracy, to limit the application of the word to the mental 

 change." If there be unconscious sensibility, this is not 

 vigorous or accurate : for in that case," mental " and "conscious" 

 are not identical, nor are "mental " and "unconscious" mutually 

 exclusive. Though sensation has always mental elements, it. 

 has not necessarily always the accompaniment of consciousness. 

 (Ment. Phys. p. 55, and 182; and Human Physiology, p. 

 740-2. 4th Ed. — in which places unconscious sensation seems 

 to be admitted). 



In "Mind" vol. i. pp. 158-9, G. H. Lewes divides the 

 matter of "unconscious sensations" between the physiologist and 

 the psychologist, as follows: " The physiologist finds himself 

 comi)ellcd to speak of ' unconscious sensations,' if he would 

 explain many phenomena." " He has to interpret these 

 phenomena in terms of matter and motion." " To the psy- 

 chologist, such language " as ' unconscious sensation,' is 

 nonsense equivalent to 'unfclt feelings,' or 'invisible light.'" 

 If the physiologist and j^sychologist, severally, can deal with 



