8 The Scottish Natutalist. 



the automatic action of the mind. This fact, so important for 

 the explanation of animal phenomena throughout, affords the 

 ground on which it can be made to appear that animals are not 

 endowed as man is with the power of voluntary action, with 

 self-determining self-regulating power. Mr. Huxley has said 

 " We have as good evidence that animals have will as that 

 they have sensation ; and as good evidence that they have both 

 sensation and volition as that man has them." The Duke of 

 Argyle joins him in the latter part of the statement, which of 

 course includes the former. I am unable to see how the state- 

 ment can be supported I think it must be denied in both its 

 affirmations, and on both on this single ground, that action, that 

 looks aiid is of an intelligent character, adaptive and purposive, 

 is not thereby proved to be truly voluntary action. Much 

 action, by being intelligent, simulates will, in which yet there 

 is no will. In reference to the first statement, that there is " as 

 good evidence that animals have volition as that they have 

 sensation," it is certainly against facts to say that there are any 

 actions in animals that as imperatively demand will for their 

 explanation, as there are actions that demand for their explana- 

 tion sensation. We cannot at all exi)lain the actions of animals 

 without the latter. We can explain it without the foi'mer. And 

 in reference to the second statement, that there is as good 

 evidence that animals possess sensation and volition, as that 

 man possesses them, it is of course granted that animals, as well 

 as men. have sensitive power. But it is not so granted in refer- 

 ence to will for men have inward experience of the possession 

 of voluntary power, whereas in animals, observation detects only 

 such action as may be referable to a source of action known as 

 existing also in man — automatic mental power. If the statement 

 had been, there is as good evidence that animals possess intelli- 

 gent power as that they have sensation, and as good evidence 

 that they have intelligent power and sensation as that men have 

 them, it might have stood. But when a distinction is drawn, 

 as facts compel us to draw it, between intelligent action 

 simply, and intelligent action that is also voluntary or in- 

 tentional, the statement cannot be maintained. The evidence 

 that animals have the power of volition is not so good as the 

 evidence that man has that power, or as the evidence that tliey 

 themselves have sensation. It is not substantiated evidence at 

 all. If there had been no action in man, that looks like the 

 action of free self-determination and purpose, and yet is not 



