232 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 



an end. Prof. Huxley speaks of the " fanatical individualism " of 

 our time as failing to construct morality from the analogy of the 

 cosmic process. An individualism which regards the cosmic 

 process as equivalent simply to an internecine struggle of each 

 against all must certainly fail to construct a satisfactory morality, 

 and I will add that any individualism which fails to recognize 

 fully the social factor, which regards society as an aggregate in- 

 stead of an organism, will, in my opinion, find itself in difficulties. 

 But I also submit that the development of the instincts which 

 directly correspond to the needs of the race, is merely another 

 case in which we aim consciously at an end which was before an 

 unintentional result of our actions. Every race, above the lowest, 

 has instincts which are only intelligible by the requirements of 

 the race ; and has both to compete with some and to form alli- 

 ances with others of its fellow-occupants of the planet. Both in 

 the unmoralized condition and in that in which morality has be- 

 come most developed, these instincts have the common charac- 

 teristics that they may be regarded as conditions of the power of 

 the race to maintain its position in the world, and so, speaking 

 roughly, to preserve or increase its own vitality. 



I will not pause to insist upon this so far as regards many 

 qualities which are certainly moral, though they may be said to 

 refer primarily to the individual. That chastity and temperance, 

 truthfulness and energy, are, on the whole, advantages both to 

 the individual and to the race, does not, I fancy, require elaborate 

 proof ; nor need I argue at length that the races in which they 

 are common will therefore have inevitable advantages in the 

 struggle for existence. Of all qualities which enable a race to 

 hold its own, none is more important than the power of organiz- 

 ing ecclesiastically, politically, and socially, and that power im- 

 plies the prevalence of justice, and the existence of mutual confi- 

 dence, and therefore of all the social virtues. The difficulty seems 

 to be felt in regard to those purely altruistic impulses which, at 

 first glance at any rate, make it apparently our duty to preserve 

 those who would otherwise be unfit to live. Virtue, says Prof. 

 Huxley, is directed "not so much to the survival of the fittest," 

 as to the " fitting of as many as possible to survive." I do not 

 dispute the statement, I think it true in a sense ; but I have a 

 difficulty as to its application. 



Morality, it is obvious, must be limited by the conditions in 

 which we are placed. What is impossible is not a duty. One 

 condition plainly is that the planet is limited. There is only 

 room for a certain number of living beings. It is one conse- 

 quence that we do in fact go on suppressing the unfit, and can 

 not help going on suppressing them. Is it desirable that it should 

 be otherwise ? Should we wish, for example, that America could 



