THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A DOG. 517 



fhroiigh his extended vocabulary of freedom, for this means a 

 walk abroad. Are not these acts precisely those of the baby dur- 

 ing the primitive period of its thinking life ? And are they not 

 dne to a mental process which in a child we always ascribe to 

 thinking ? 



Toots's perception of ideas, even thoughts, conveyed in sen- 

 tences uttered in ordinary conversation, surpasses anything I 

 have ever observed in dogs, except in Scotch collies. If, in the 

 course of ordinary family chat, the question is interpolated, " Do 

 you want to go out ?'' he bounds to his feet ; if in the same tone 

 he is told, " You can not go out," he takes his disappointment 

 without further demonstration, though no other words or ges- 

 tures of command are added. Even while asleep, if the word 

 " cat " is used in the current of conversation, he remains undis- 

 turbed ; but utter the combination "black cat," and he rushes to 

 the window to take an observation. The examples thus far given 

 can not be referred to automatic or reflex action ; they belong to 

 the operation of cerebration, and involve ideation, classification, 

 and judgment in other words, thinking. At least such would 

 be the conclusion were they the acts of a two-year-old baby. 



Very early in his history Toots was taught to sit on his 

 haunches, receiving bits of food as a reward for the performance. 

 It was observed that he spontaneously raised his hands, as an 

 additional expression of desire. This act was encouraged and de- 

 veloped by taking hold of his arms and waving them vertically, 

 until the whole combined action became habitual, and was ren- 

 dered in answer to the command, " Wave your hands ! " After a 

 long period of practice in sitting posture with hand-waving, 

 under various circumstances and in most fascinating fashion, he 

 disclosed the power of imitation. When held upright in the arms 

 of another, and when already satisfied with food, I waved my 

 hands before him, and he at once copied the same motion, and is 

 always ready to do so in answer to this gesture. 



Here appears to be a case of imitation, pure and simple, that 

 calls for a reasonable explanation. Prof. Preyer says : " In order 

 to imitate, one must first perceive through the senses ; secondly, 

 have an idea of what has been perceived ; thirdly, execute a move- 

 ment correspondent to the idea." * And further, it may be added, 

 since a volition is involved, there must be a consciousness of self, 

 or a formation of the concept " I." All this is granted in the case 

 of a child ; why not also in the case of a dog ? 



Scarcely anything is lacking in the mental furniture of this 

 psychological dog to make him the equal of a baby two years old, 

 except thinking in words ; and who can prove that he is destitute 



* The Senses and the Will, p. 282. 



