THE METAPHYSICS OF SCIENCE. 367 



his reasoning is illusory; but he builds, sometimes un- 

 mindful of the fact that his fabric rests upon a purely 

 and deeply metaphysical subsumption. 



II. Admitting the evidence of personal existence suffi- 

 cient, other queries immediately arise which must be dis- 

 posed of. Science we have defined as beginning objectively 

 in a knowledge of phenomena. Now, how do we know 

 that phenomena exist? or that they exist as they seem? 

 or that any reality lies behind them? or that the reality 

 is such as it seems to be? Plainly, all these things are 

 assumed on the naked testimony of the mind. Conscious- 

 ness reports phenomena, and we believe. Consciousness 

 represents them thus and so, and we believe. And then 

 we find disclosed in consciousness a confidence that all 

 phenomena are grounded in real existence, and that such 

 phenomena as these are grounded in a mode of existence 

 sustaining an exact correlation to these particular phe- 

 nomena. This confidence is only belief in the ultimate 

 verdict of our being. All science, to he substantial, must 

 assume the validity of all these ultimate beliefs. The most 

 logical conclusions of science must necessarily imply that 

 there are some propositions which do not admit of logical 

 proof, but which must be received with absolute unreserve. 

 These ultimate propositions are simply believed without 

 reasonine^; but our belief is so strong? that we feel it to 

 be knowledge. If it is not knowledge, the fabric of propo- 

 sitions which we build upon it is not knowledge. If it 

 is knowledge, then the plain, simple, ultimate utterances 

 of our minds are the indestructible molecules of all our 

 systems of science; and the testimony of consciousness re- 

 specting the coordination between any of its states and 

 external realities is a direct intuition of truth. 



