150 The Scottish Naturalist. 



an inconsistency of procedure, Mr. Huxley's result, substantively, 

 could not be accepted as a possibly true account of animal 

 action, not to speak of human action. Admitting the analogy 

 of man's mind at all, it is a result that cannot apply to all the 

 facts. The animal transcends it. Blind automatism of an or- 

 ganism is one thing, and is a sufficient account of certain 

 actions. Blind automatism in an emotional and intelligent 

 principle is a very different thing, and is the equally sufficient 

 and necessary account of certain other and very different actions, 

 The actions of animals are not susceptible of interpretation 

 throughout by the former. Many of them, the actions i.e. in 

 which there is, we would say, intelligence, require the latter. Be- 

 sides you cannot divorce intelligence even from sensation. " It 

 is manifestly impossible," says Sir W. Hamilton, "to discrimi- 

 nate with any rigour, sense from intelligence," (Reid 878 and 

 881). It is not organism that feels or sees or hears. There is 

 no place for sensations or emotions or ideas but in mind. 

 " Mind seeth it, mind heareth it. All beside is deaf and dumb." 

 Far less can you divorce what can only be called emotional and 

 ideational action from an intelligent principle. We have no clue 

 to the interpretation of animal action, but the clue our own 

 action gives. This action reveals that intelligent mind is com- 

 petent to act in an automatic manner. And we hail the discovery 

 as applicable to our difficulties with animal action. As far as 

 investigation has yet gone, the line on which we seem to be in- 

 vited to proceed, in order to resolve the mystery of the animal 

 soul, is certainly automatism. But while we are promisingly 

 invited along this line, we are also warned from the same quarter 

 not to leave out of our automatism the automatic action of 

 intelligence. 



But however different may be the part allotted to the soul in 

 two such views as those we have been considering, it is admit- 

 ted by both that soul of some kind in animals there is. Both, 

 therefore, remain burdened with the question, is the mind of 

 animals of the same nature with that of man' — the same out and 

 out in nature, though possibly differing in capacity ? or is there 

 an essential difference between the two? We have already 

 seen how that question is answered by the prevailing voice of 

 the science of the day. So decided is the answer, that the 

 popular notion of an essential distinction is, as we have seen, 

 held to be little more than a superstition. A contributor to this 

 Journal, Dr. Lauder Lindsay, is one of the ablest and boldest 



