ZOOLOGY. 



ANIMAL PSYCHOSIS. 



( Continued from p. 153. ^ 

 By the Rev. J. Wardrop. 



IF animals have not a self or self-consciousness, let us see 

 what else they must be destitute of, that man, in having a 

 self and self-consciousness, has ; and let us observe, besides, if 

 it be not the fact that, what the absence of selfhood dooms 

 animals by inference to be without is exactly what they cannot 

 by observation be proved to have. 



2. A self or person is not only, as a being, self-conscious, but 

 as an intelligence, it is self-regulated, and as an agent, it is self- 

 determined. A self is a freely active and productive power. It 

 is not only power, nisus, action, but will of self-determined 

 action. Man is such a self or person. Will is an essential 

 element of our personality. Kant says, will is a man's " proper 

 self." In the proper sense of the term "Will is a power of 

 control over the other faculties or capacities of our nature, 

 by means of which we are enabled to determine personal 

 activity" (Calderwood, Hdb. of Moral Phil. p. 165). In 

 this sense of the term, "an animal," as Goodsir says (Anat. 

 Mem. 1. 213), "has no will." Will is not only characteristic 

 of man, as introspection at once shows, but observation of 

 animal action can discover nothing to prevent us from call- 

 ing it also distinctive of man. There is no indication of 

 proper voluntary agency in the animal. All its activity is 

 determined for it and necessary. Huxley's doctrine that man's 

 volitions, so called, do not enter into the chain of causation of 

 his actions, who that looks within himself can for a moment 

 admit? It is the grovelling doctrine of H. G. Atkinson and 

 Harriet Martineau over again. "All causes are material 

 causes." " I am what I am," it makes a man say. " A creature 

 of necessity, I claim neither merit nor demerit. I feel that I 

 am as completely the result of my nature, and impelled to do 



