2o8 The Scottish Naturalist. 



from the human type. It requires a self-regulated intelligence, 

 having conceptional powers, and a self-determined activity in 

 the use of them, — a person, in short, to make use of tools or 

 machinery, or to store their products and follow a system of 

 material accumulation. Animals are as incapable of material 

 civilization as of intellectual. In reference to some of the 

 above points, and some others not here mentioned, the follow- 

 ing passage from a very able, though not always a very clear 

 writer, is well worth quoting — 



" Nothing appears more really conclusive against all sup- 

 posed capacity for great development 'in the animal' than the 

 history of what are called ' learned animals;' of the mechanical 

 means necessarily employed for teaching them, and the me- 

 chanical results obtained. There is, indeed, no better word to 

 describe the true state of the case than the term ' mechanical,' 

 as opposed to everything that is ideal or truly creative. If a 

 brute could idealise the laws of outward nature, or the laws con- 

 necting his own powers with their proper functions, he might 

 see them as a man does, and give them a fresh existence within 

 his own intelligence. He would then be able to invent an 

 alphabet, conceive a picture, and view the properties of outward 

 objects as universals inwardly apprehended. In this way he 

 would acquire exemption from the reign of mechanism, and live 

 a really creative life. It is manifest at a glance how far in fact 

 these conquests are from the world of creatures — by us, there- 

 fore, called unreasoning. Art, letters, and abstract thought are 

 no visitants of the animal sphere. Words cannot come where 

 thoughts are not, and therefore language, in the human meaning 

 of the term, is unknown to brutes ; and no effort of man has 

 ever been successful in sharing with his humble companions 

 any one (much less all) of these attainments. His artistic sense 

 of Beauty, and power of giving it varied expression, find no 

 echo beneath himself. He can in nowise teach by historical 

 record, poetry, abstract calculation, or abstract thought. 

 Neither can he impart the true secret of social sympathy, and 

 forbid the stricken deer to weep and die alone. Intelligence 

 without imagination cannot conceive a sorrow so lonely or un- 

 seen, therefore it knows little of deep sorrow, for even the 

 mortally wounded bird will strive to hide its wound." — (Jack- 

 son, Philosophy of Nat. Theology, pp. 312-3). 



Is it open to us to hold an identity of mental principle where 

 the mental powers are so opposite ? Till it can be shown that 



