The Scottish Naturalist. 211 



taneously approving the right and disapproving- the wrong, their 

 actions may be expected to reveal its presence. If their actions 

 do not reveal the influence of such a faculty, why place its 

 possession among possibilities — except indeed for the sake of 

 the conclusion ? 



Thus, the whole round of faculty that belongs to human self- 

 hood is untouched at any one point by any power within the 

 animal range. There is no inward self to be either a free pro- 

 ductive power or a conscious end to the brutes. Their outward 

 individual life, and the life of their race, is all that their actions 

 are directed to maintain ; and not for a moment is either that 

 life or its maintenance before their consciousness or in their 

 purpose in the homefelt sense of being theirs, their end, and their 

 work. Such is the effect of the absence in them of self con- 

 sciousness and free agency on the higher psychical functions. 



But now, since this want of personality affects the very nature 

 of the psychical principle itself, does it not affect also the 

 character even of the lower manifestations of mind, such as have 

 been allowed to be similar to those of man ? If, on passing up 

 the scale of mental powers, we come at last to personality, w r ith 

 its accompanying specialities, and find them awanting in ani- 

 mals, must not this fatal want at the top make its influence be 

 felt on the previous series, even to the bottom, and really 

 transform all the psychical powers we have previously allowed 

 to have a similarity to man's, into something quite different 

 from the human type? All human mental operations, from 

 sensation upwards, are accompanied, we have seen, by a real 

 home-coming knowledge of self. Those of animals never are. 

 Are the two series, in that case, even at the start, of the same 

 type ? Ending wide as the poles asunder, do they begin in 

 identity ? We find them beyond dispute diametrically divergent 

 at last, must not this radical distinction cast its shadow before, 

 and establish a variety of type from the beginning? At all 

 events, where the powers manifested are so widely different, the 

 principial source cannot be the same. 



There is no reasoning ever yet resorted to by the keenest 

 advocate of identity that has even plausibility about it, or, at 

 least, such a speciousness as will bear a second look. When Bayle 

 argues that the souls are the same, and that it is only deficiency 

 of organisation in the animal tribes to which their deficiency 

 in psychical manifestation is due, — this would have argued a 

 serious mistake on the part of the Creator, unless it had turned 



