252 The Scottish Naturalist. 



he goes, are sufficient to carry him thus farther. Those who 

 do not interpret the facts to the identity of the animal and 

 human mind, are of course not put to difficulties by the in- 

 stances of greater mental perfection displayed in the animal 

 world. These instances, in fact, are of themselves sufficient to 

 discountenance utterly the idea of sameness of nature, while, 

 in other directions, in the words of Bacon (Advancement 

 of Learning, Bk. iv. chap. 3), "There are many excel- 

 lencies of the human soul above the souls of brutes, mani- 

 fest even to those who philosophise only according to sense. 

 And wherever so many and such great excellencies are found, 

 a specific difference should always be made. We do not, 

 therefore, approve that confused and promiscuous manner of 

 the philosophers in treating the functions of the soul, as if the 

 soul of man differed in degree, rather than species, from the 

 soul of brutes, as the sun differs from the stars, or gold from 

 metals." Dr. Lindsay's conclusion cannot stand on the premises. 

 What kind of soul, positively, the animal has, since it specifi- 

 cally differs from the human, it is hard to say. All we can say 

 is, man has a soul that is a self or personality. The animal has 

 a soul that is not a self. We have got a negative position. 

 But we are without a positive. The abyss remains. The 

 mystery is unsolved. We may see a little farther, or a little 

 more clearly into its depths. To search the bottom seems 

 meanwhile hopeless. 



It might have been surmised that we had drawn the line 

 between matter and mind too low, and been unjust to material 

 force and its capabilities in supposing them not competent to 

 evolve the phenomena of the animal world with which we are 

 dealing. But though we were to draw the line higher, it does 

 not appear that we could ever be permitted to strike it so high 

 as that all animal psychosis could be reduced within the range 

 of material force. There are animal manifestations such, that 

 we have no analogy, nor evidence or ground of any sort to 

 permit us to lay at their root aught but a psychical principle — a 

 soul. There may, however, be souls and souls. One soul 

 may differ from another soul in kind and quality. And then, 

 if function is to be allowed to be a chief determinant of biologi- 

 cal distinctions, must we not fall back, with Geoffroy St. 

 Hilaire, Isidore St. Hilaire, Goodsir, and Quaterfages, on the 

 position that human beings, x 'a community of persons," consti- 

 tute a kingdom, distinct from that mere aggregate of sensitive 



