ZOOLOGY. 



ITOTHEK KEMAEKS ON ANIMAL PSYCHOSIS. 

 By the Rev. J. WARDROP. 



ON this subject the following conclusions have already 

 been reached : — ist, That animal action is not to be 

 explained simply by the automatism of the material organism — 

 the mental states taking no part, but standing by as idle spec- 

 tators of the organic movements. 2nd, That it is to be 

 explained by the automatic action of the organism, and of an 

 intelligent principle both. $rd, That the intelligent principle 

 in animals is not a self-conscious or self-determined or self- 

 regulated power ; in other words, the animal soul does not 

 constitute a free personality, and therefore is not of the same 

 kind with the human soul. Animals are not self-conscious 

 beings ; and they are not so because they have no self of which 

 to be conscious. They are not persons as far as evidence goes. 

 If the question in reference to them were — Persons or things ? 

 I should certainly go in for things. But that alternative is not 

 one to be put ; for it prejudices what seems to be the very 

 point to be settled by the investigation. It supposes persons 

 or things to make up the totality of existence. But, between 

 beings that have neither soul nor personality, and beings that 

 have both, are there not a class that have the one but want the 

 other — have the soul but want the personality ? Animals seem 

 to be such midway beings. They are capable of actions which 

 we can ascribe only to an intelligent soul as their principle. 

 But that that intelligence is a self-conscious, free, or personal 

 intelligence is the point at which the evidence in their favour 

 fails. And I do not see on what a priori or presumptive 

 ground it could be established anterior to facts in the case, that 



