DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 31 



The highest outcome of this habit of sympathetic indignation 

 against wrong is a disinterested repugnance to wrong when done by 

 the individual himself. A child injures another in some way, either 

 in momentary anger or through thoughtlessness. As soon as he is able 

 to reflect, his habit of sympathy asserts itself, and causes him to suffer 

 with the injured one. He puts himself at the point of view of the 

 child he has wronged, and from that point of view looks back on him- 

 self, the doer of the wrong, with a new feeling of self-condemnation. 

 On the other hand, when he fulfills his duty to another or renders him 

 a kindness, he gains a genuine satisfaction by imaginatively realizing 

 the feelings of the recipient of the service, and so looking back on his 

 action with complacency and approval. 



When this stage of moral progress is reached, the child will iden- 

 tify himself with the moral law in a new and closer way. He will no 

 longer do right merely because an external authority commands, or 

 because he sees it to some extent to be his interest to do so. The de- 

 velopment of the unselfish feelings has now connected an internal pain, 

 the pang of self-condemnation, and of remorse, with the consciousness 

 of acting wrongly ; and this pain, being immediate and certain, acts 

 as a constant and never-failing sanction. 



The higher developments of the moral sentiment involve not only 

 a deepening and quickening of the feelings, but a considerable enlight- 

 enment of the intelligence. In order to detect the subtler distinctions 

 between right and wrong, delicate intellectual processes have to be car- 

 ried out. Rapidity and certainty of moral insight are the late result 

 of wide experience, and a long and systematic exercise of the moral 

 faculty on its emotional and intellectual side alike. 



Since the moral feeling stands in a peculiarly close relation to the 

 will, the practical problem of exercising and developing it is intimately 

 connected with the education of the will and the formation of the 

 moral character. This larger problem we have not yet reached, but 

 we may even at this stage inquire into the best means of developing 

 the moral sentiment regarded apart from its influence as a motive to 

 action, and merely as an emotional and intellectual product. 



Inasmuch as the government of the parent and the teacher is the 

 external agency that first acts upon the germ of the moral sentiment, 

 it is evident that the work of training the moral feelings and judg- 

 ment forms a conspicuous feature in the plan of early education. The 

 nature of the home discipline more particularly is a prime factor in de- 

 termining the first movements of growth of the childish sense of duty. 

 In order that any system of discipline may have a beneficial moral in- 

 fluence and tend in the direction of moral growth, it must satisfy the 

 requirements of a good and efficient system. What these are is a point 

 which will be considered later on. Here it must suffice to say that 

 rules must be laid down absolutely, and enforced uniformly and con- 

 sistently, yet with a careful consideration of circumstances and indi- 



