LITERARY NOTICES. 



557 



tieal applications to the art of education, 

 with the view of "satisfying an increas- 

 ingly felt want among teachers, viz., of an 

 exposition of the elements of mental sci- 

 ence in their bearing on the work of train- 

 ing and developing the minds of the young." 

 Hence, in this particular volume we have a 

 contribution rather to the science of educa- 

 tion than to that of psychology. The larger 

 work, though not by any means destitute of 

 educational applications, is to be looked to 

 primarily for the author's views upon the 

 theoretical aspects of mental science. The 

 aim of the newer book is practical. It is 

 to be classed in the same category, for ex- 

 ample, with Bain's " Education as a Sci- 

 ence," though quite a different work from 

 the latter in plan and execution. Mr. Sully 

 condenses the principles of mental science, 

 and shows what bearing those principles 

 and the facts of which they are generaliza- 

 tions have upon the teacher's art. As its 

 name imports, it is written not for the pu- 

 pil chiefly, but for the instructor, or the 

 student of educational methods. 



Mr. Sully can hardly lay claim to the 

 rank of a discoverer of new psychological 

 truths. This, certainly, is no disadvantage 

 to the success of a work like the " Teacher's 

 Hand-Book." "What is wanted is, the as- 

 certained and accepted, so that the teacher 

 may know what science, as knowledge veri- 

 fied, declares about the mind and its opera- 

 tions. This want the author has evidently 

 understood, for he has been successful in 

 keeping within the bounds of legitimate sci- 

 ence. Very little exception can be taken to 

 his statements of psychological facts and 

 principles. He is never dogmatic at dis- 

 puted points, he has no metaphysical hobby 

 which he is bent upon riding, indulges in 

 no polemical discussions, but proceeds in a 

 direct, simple, and effective manner to work 

 out what he tells us in his preface are the 

 objects of his book. No better proof, for 

 instance, of the good sense of the writer 

 can be adduced than the fact that, in treat- 

 ing of volition, there is actually no mention 

 made of the controversies over the "free- 

 dom of the will." That expression, indeed, 

 does not occur, nor does " free-will " in any 

 metaphysical sense. We are sure the hack- 

 neyed dispute will never be missed, but the 

 self-restraint indicated by this omission is 

 as remarkable as it is praiseworthy. 



We are not always quite satisfied, how. 

 ever, with the author's psychological enun- 

 ciations. For illustration, we will mention 

 his statements about association : he makes 

 out plainly enough in his larger work that 

 there are not three distinct modes of associ- 

 ation, but that they can be reduced to one ; 

 and yet, with too much caution he sets forth 

 in the " Hand-Book " three, contiguity, simi- 

 larity, and contrast, because it is "usual" 

 to do so. This is not a sufficient reason, 

 especially when contrast has been clearly 

 shown not to be an independent principle 

 of association for as long a time as Profess- 

 or Bain's " Senses and Intellect " and Her- 

 bert Spencer's " Principles of Psychology " 

 have been published. Besides, to retain 

 this as a mode of association is misleading. 

 We do not associate by difference but by like- 

 nesses. Association is a process of integra- 

 tion. It is always and essentially what its 

 name imports assimilation. Representa- 

 tion, a differentiating power, brings up past 

 experiences which association integrates and 

 redintegrates with each other and with pre- 

 sentative experiences. The latter process 

 is the assimilation of contiguities, a segre- 

 gation and unification of similarities in ex- 

 perience. We think Mr. Sully might advan- 

 tageously have elucidated in this manner the 

 true nature of association and its connection 

 with the general laws of evolution, since the 

 notes he makes in the " Outlines of Psychol- 

 ogy " show that he is alive to the objections 

 that have been raised to the mode of state- 

 ment he adopts. In fact, he allows their 

 force. Why, then, retain what he does not 

 believe in, merely because it is " usual " ? 

 We all concede that errors are common, but 

 can not, therefore, argue that they should be 

 persisted in. 



We are inclined to charge our author 

 also with an occasional sin of omission. 

 We are surprised to find that he says so 

 little about belief, for instance, since he 

 has made the nature of that mental state 

 or act a special study, as appears in one of 

 his earlier works, "Sensation and Intui- 

 tion," and also in the " Outlines of Psychol- 

 ogy." In the " Hand-Book," however, there 

 is little more than a passing allusion, in con- 

 nection with the subject of doubt. The term 

 belief is so universally employed in common 

 and scientific use to indicate a certain men- 

 tal attitude, or certain mental operations, 



