702 



THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



Psychology : The Cognitive Powers. By 

 James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., Litt. D. 

 New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 

 1886. Pp. 245. Price, $1.50. 



The author says in his preface : " For the 

 last thirty-four years I have been teaching 

 psychology. . . . From year to year I have 

 been improving my course, and I claim to 

 have advanced with the times." No one 

 acquainted with Dr. McCosh's earlier trea- 

 tises would deny upon examining this one 

 that he has "advanced." The trouble is, 

 he has not advanced fast enough nor far 

 enough " the times " have distanced him 

 in the race ; and, after we have given all 

 due credit, we have to confess to ourselves 

 that this latest work leaves us with the con- 

 sciousness of a good deal to be desired. We 

 suppose the author would maintain that his 

 account of the cognitive powers is scientific. 

 But at the very outset a suspicion is cast 

 upon its scientific character by the opening 

 sentence : " Psychology is the science of the 

 soul. ... By soul is meant that self of 

 which every one is conscious." Now, we fear 

 Dr. McCosh's Scotch fondness for theological 

 battles has interfered in this case with that 

 simplicity of truth which the faithful ex- 

 positor of science ought to exhibit in his 

 statements. The implications of the word 

 soul extend much further than is indicated. 

 Dr. Keid expressed them when he said, " It 

 is a primitive belief that the thinking prin- 

 ciple is something different from the bodily 

 organism, and, when we wish to signalize its 

 peculiar nature and destiny, we call it soul 

 or spirit." In a word, soul has reference 

 distinctively to mind as immortal or as capa- 

 ble of existing independently of the present 

 bodily organism. This meaning is not open- 

 ly declared by Dr. McCosh, but by the use 

 of the term an argument is quietly instilled 

 into the mind of the reader. President Por- 

 ter, who also calls psychology the " science 

 of the soul," is much more frank in his ex- 

 position. But, certainly, inasmuch as the 

 immortality of the soul is something which 

 we all hope psychology will demonstrate as 

 a result of the examination of mental pro- 

 cesses and powers, would it not be more 

 satisfactory to every one and add to the 

 value of our researches if we did not start 

 out with assuming the point to be proved ? 

 This same disposition to study mind for the 



purpose of substantiating some theory crops 

 out all too noticeably throughout the whole 

 work. To refer again to the preface, we 

 are informed that idealism and agnosticism 

 are to be exploded, and, as we go on, the 

 claws of polemical metaphysics protrude 

 far too often for the scientific value of the 

 book. The writer is fond of u laying down " 

 positions which "deliver us" from great 

 philosophical errors of the day. No doubt 

 they do, but the warrant for laying them 

 down is unfortunately not always so plain 

 as the eagerness to establish them. 



This is a very serious defect. Besides, 

 although we find much to approve in par- 

 ticular statements, the latest, the clearest, 

 the best results of psychological study are not 

 brought out nor recognized as they should 

 be. The same cloudiness and contradiction 

 which perplex the student in the " Intu- 

 itions of the Mind" annoy us here. The 

 classification of mental powers and their 

 modes of exercise is cumbrous and anti- 

 quated. It is not so good as that of Sir 

 William Hamilton, and is inferior to that 

 of President Porter. We have, for exam- 

 ple, no less than " six different capacities " 

 of the representative powers, among which 

 is placed association. But association is as 

 much concerned with presentative knowl- 

 edge as it is with representative ; and even 

 the old divisions of reproductive and pro- 

 ductive imagination or memory and imagi- 

 nation would be quite sufficient to cover all 

 not included under association. Moreover, 

 it is very confusing to find afterward as dis- 

 tinct powers the comparative, including the 

 apprehension of relations and discursive 

 operations, as if the associative and rep- 

 resentative powers were not adequate to 

 explain all these mental acts. Moreover, 

 under the " relations " classified, we notice 

 identity and difference, and then resem- 

 blance. Obviously, identity is only com- 

 plete agreement, and resemblance less com- 

 plete ; while it may be said of the whole 

 catalogue of relations mentioned, that it 

 would certainly be greatly simplified by al- 

 most every authority in psychological and 

 logical science. 



The treatment of the discursive opera- 

 tions is exceedingly meager, but doubtless 

 the author thinks this should be left for 

 logic. The exposition of sense-perception is 



