77 8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



it important, to give it relief, vividness, and force. Suppose one per- 

 son should warn another that he is going to prick him with a pin at a 

 particular point in the skin. For some minutes that pin-prick will 

 have a menacing presence. All the force of the victim's attention 

 will be borne upon it, though it is really inoffensive, and the thought 

 will finally become almost painful. If the same prick had surprised 

 him without his having had time to think about it and concentrated 

 attention upon the insignificant wound, it would probably have passed 

 off unnoticed. But by virtue of attention it has become a great matter. 

 So we may prepare for something we dread, and the long preparation 

 will contribute to double our fear of it. Thus attention is, as well 

 as imagination, an excitatory force, and may render extremely sensitive 

 to fear persons who, without it, might have been bold to insolence. It 

 is true that attention is voluntary to a certain point. We may, it is 

 said, turn away our thoughts to some other subject. But attention 

 can be commanded only when indifferent matters are in question. 

 Violent imaginings and strong emotions command it and are not com- 

 manded by it. Thus, from whatever side we regard the problem, we 

 shall find that fear, whether as a sensation or as a conscious emotion, 

 is dependent on our individual excitability and is quite independent 

 of the will. Yet the will may intervene ; but, however powerful we 

 may suppose it to be, it has no effect on our feelings, but only on our 

 acts. 



The soldier who hears the bullets whistling around him can not 

 control his emotion, which is legitimate ; but, by an effort of the will, 

 he can keep from running away and continue to march on. Perhaps 

 a still stronger effort of the will would be required to arrest the 

 psychical reflex movement of dodging, but that is also possible. The 

 will is, therefore, equivalent to a power of inhibition. The power is 

 variable among different persons, and this variability occasions the 

 different degrees of courage. 



We have here, apparently, an antagonism between two contrary 

 forces : on one side is the emotion, which incites to certain acts ; on 

 the other side is the will, or inhibitory power, which prevents those 

 acts. It seems that when we are stirred by an emotion it can be best 

 opposed by an inverse emotion. The soldier in battle is sustained 

 against his fear by the honor of the flag, the sense of personal dignity, 

 the presence of his chiefs and comrades, ideas of duty and discipline, 

 fear of chastisement, love of country, the hope of reward, and other 

 strong motives. But the soldier's will and the factors that re-enforce 

 it have no control over his organic movements. Though he can re- 

 sist the inclination to run away and to dodge, he can not hinder him- 

 self from trembling and growing pale, or prevent the violent beat- 

 ings of his heart and the cold sweat. It would therefore be unjust to 

 reproach a person who has passed through a great danger for having 

 become pallid and quaked. Turenne quaked, and he was not a coward. 



