104 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 



regulated by right, it must or should be the same with international 

 relations. It is ever the case that the law of nations has not the cer- 

 tainty or authority of the civil or public law, which is almost every- 

 where codified, while the law of nations can not be, inasmuch as 

 huuraanity is not organized. The arguments which may be advanced 

 against the existence of the law of nations are, in a measure, appli- 

 cable to the private international law. If the latter is a branch of the 

 former, it may be said that what is true of the one is true of the 

 other. There is only this difference, that the law of nations regulates 

 public interests, while the private international law is virtually identi- 

 cal with the civil law of each state ; and only occupies itself with pri- 

 vate interests. This difference is considerable, and leads to important 

 consequences. The existence of a law, proj^erly so called, regulating 

 the relations of nations with each other is, at best, problematical ; as 

 yet it is force alone which decides their disputes. This is not the 

 case with the private international laws of different nations. It is 

 they, not the nations, which are on trial ; it is individuals, and the 

 courts, and not the sword, which must decide their differences. 



In order that we have a private international law, man must en- 

 joy everywhere the same rights whatever be his nationality that is, 

 he must enjoy everywhere equally the same civil or private rights. 

 Now, what are civil or private rights ? Certain faculties, the exer- 

 cise of which is necessary to man for his physical, intellectual, and 

 moral existence. Can a man exercise these everywhere, or are they 

 limited to the state in which he was born ? Man is not an incorjDo- 

 real hereditament, attached to the soil on which he was born, but is a 

 citizen of the world ; he establishes himself where circumstances, or 

 his faculties, call him ; even without quitting his natal soil he can en- 

 ter into relation with the entire world. Why should his natural rights 

 stop at the frontiers of his country ? Is it because humanity is di- 

 vided into different nations, each having its separate organization 

 and particular laws ? It is true that the division of the human race 

 into distinct nations has this for an effect, that each man has a dis- 

 tinct country, in the bosom of which he exercises the political rights 

 that pertain to the citizen, but he can not enjoy these rights outside 

 of his own country ; the quality of citizen gives exclusive rights and 

 imposes exclusive duties. 



But the political separation of states has nothing in common with 

 the enjoyment of private rights : if it is impossible for me to be an 

 elector or juror in any one state or country, that is no reason why I 

 should not become proprietor wherever it pleased me to purchase. 

 The exclusion from the enjoyment of political rights should not also 

 necessarily exclude the enjoyment of private rights. A person should 

 enjoy everywhere the same civil rights, since they are an accessory of 

 life. The diversity of states and their constitutions should be no 

 obstacle, for these rights are not due to the foreigner as a citizen ; they 



