212 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 



That this interpretation harmonizes with the facts which modern 

 times have furnished, scarcely needs jDointing out. On an immensely 

 larger scale and in ways variously modified, here by the slow collapse 

 of an old regime and there by combination for war, the rise of the 

 first French Republic and that of the American Republic have similarly 

 shown us this tendency toward resumption of the primitive form of 

 political organization, when a decayed or otherwise incapable govern- 

 ment is broken up. Greatly obscured by complicating circumstances 

 and special incidents as these transformations were, we may recognize 

 in them the play of the same general causes. 



In the last chapter we saw that, as conditions determine, the first 

 element of the triune political structure may be differentiated from 

 the second in various degrees beginning with the warrior chief 

 slightly predominant over other warriors, and endiag with the divine 

 and absolute king, widely distinguished from the select few next to 

 him. By the foregoing examples we are showm that the second ele- 

 ment is, as conditions determine, variously differentiated from the 

 third : being at the one extreme qualitatively distinguished in a high 

 degree and divided from it by an impassable barrier, and at the other 

 extreme almost merged into it. / 



Here we are introduced to the truth next to be dealt with : that 

 not only do conditions determine the various forms which compound 

 heads assume, but that conditions determine the various changes they 

 undergo. There are two leading kinds of such changes those through 

 which the compound head passes toward a less popular form, and those 

 through which it passes toward a more popular form. We will glance 

 at them in this order. 



Progressive narrowing of the compound head is one of the con- 

 comitants of continued military activity. Beginning with the case of 

 Sparta, the constitution of which in its* early form differed but little 

 from that which the " Iliad " shows us existed among the Homeric 

 Greeks, we see, in the first place, the tendency toward concentration 

 of power in the regulation, made a century after Lykurgus, that, " in 

 case the people decided crookedly, the senate with the kings should 

 reverse their decisions " ; and then we see that later, in consequence of 

 the gravitation of property into fewer hands, "the number of quali- 

 fied citizens went on continually diminishing " : the implication being 

 not only a relatively-increased power of the oligarchy, but, probably, 

 a growing supremacy of the wealthier members within the oligarchy 

 itself. Turning to the case of Rome, ever militant, we find that in 

 course of time inequalities increased to the extent that the senate be- 

 came " an order of lords, filling up its ranks by hereditary succession, 

 and exercising collegiate misrule " ; and then " out of the evil of oli- 

 garchy there emerged the still worse evil of usurpation of power by 

 particular families." In the Italian republics, again, perpetually at 



