196 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



troubled, nevertheless, lest they may lose the connection with the 

 sciences, and particularly with that special research and exact calcula- 

 tion under the influence of which a happy reaction has made itself 

 felt in the various departments of philosophy against the intuitive and 

 undisciplined ways of thinking that have characterized many meta- 

 physicians. 



As in life all gives place to the question of the highest utility, so 

 in science all gives place to pure theoretical interest in enriching our 

 knowledge of facts. But, while this may find its justification in the 

 history of culture, the problems of the work of culture are no more 

 exhausted thereby than the problems of thought. Philosophy would 

 surrender her most important function were she to shirk the solution 

 of those problems which she alone can solve. To these problems 

 belong, last not least, those of ethics. 



The progress of scientific knowledge in all domains of inquiry is 

 the mightiest instrument in aid of the progress of culture. Its influ- 

 ence reaches, directly or indirectly, to all human relations, not except- 

 ing moral development. Apparent contradictions diminish or disap- 

 pear before the macroscopic glance, which, not fixed upon any isolated 

 point, takes in the whole range of facts and causes in their mutual 

 relations. We are at the same time convinced, even by the considera- 

 tion of the educational influence which scientific efforts have acquired 

 in all strata of modern society, that all is not done. The gap is visible 

 and sensible in philosophy and in life. 



The needs of a great community of thinking men neither seek nor 

 find any satisfaction in the dogmas of a positive confession of faith, 

 while, for the foundation of a system of practical regulative laws 

 and ethical principles, the progress of inductive science does not fur- 

 nish all that is needed. A bridge is wanted, which shall establish con- 

 nection with active life ; a well-spring of right, from which laws and 

 principles can be drawn and distributed. 



According to some philosophers, ethics stands or falls with meta- 

 physics. That this is not the case has been proved by the isolated 

 achievements in moral philosophy of the disciples of modern positiv- 

 ism, and is demonstrated afresh by Herbert Spencer in his " Data of 

 Ethics." This author occupies so conspicuous a position among the 

 philosophic writers of the century, that the summons to a study of his 

 works may well find ample response. 



"We may gather, from the preface to his last work, how Herbert 

 Spencer, like other founders of great philosophic systems, esteems the 

 importance of ethics. " This last part of the task it is to which I re- 

 gard all the preceding parts as subsidiary." From the beginning of 

 his philosophical activity this was the " last goal," the object to which 

 all efforts were preparatory to find a scientific basis for. the principles 

 of good and bad in action. 



" Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by 



