A GERMAN VIEW OF THE "DATA OF ETHICS:' 199 



to establish normal principles. It was, therefore, necessary to loosen 

 the bonds which had bound ethics to unscientific propositions and 

 dogmas of traditional transcendentalism, and to establish its scientific 

 character by a union with the foundations of our scientific knowledge. 

 This, in brief, is the programme for the reform of ethics, or, rather, 

 for its establishment on a new basis. The unscientific methods em- 

 ployed by ethical writers are sharply criticised ; the logical propositions 

 upon which the foundation of scientific ethics depends are clearly 

 stated ; and the false premises exposed which render all scientific pro- 

 cedure impossible. 



In the exposition of the relativity of suffering and enjoyment, and 

 in the sections on " Egoism versus Altruism " and " Altruism versus 

 Egoism," the author grapples with the fundamental problems of an- 

 thropological ethics. The priority of egoism is convincingly set forth, 

 the spontaneous origin of pure altruism, and the interdependence and 

 complementary relations of both principles ; while the one-sided as- 

 sertions and demands of their respective champions are refuted. The 

 final reconciliation of egoism and altruism is inferred from evolution, 

 from which the author also reaches that conciliatory and compromising 

 position which enables him to reconcile many seemingly contradictory 

 phenomena. 



Evolutionary morals are wholly hedonistic. The happiness-giving 

 is the good ; and it is owing to theological and political influences 

 alone that mankind overlook this truth. The idea and the desire of 

 happiness, of perfect well-being, necessarily mark the character of 

 good conduct. Moral life is a series of compromises between egoism 

 and altruism. All other moral principles derive their conditional 

 justification from this first principle of human action, which is charac- 

 terized by Kant as the negation of all morality. The idea of perfecti- 

 bility is tried by the same standard, and we are reminded that capacity 

 for the reception of happiness is the highest proof of the perfectibility 

 of human nature. Aristotle, who recognized happiness as the highest 

 aim of human endeavor, took a step out of his way when he " sought 

 to define happiness by the aid of the word ' virtue,' instead of defining 

 virtue by the aid of the word ' happiness.' " Hence it must be con- 

 ceded that " the conception of virtue can not be separated from the 

 conception of happiness-producing conduct ; and that, as this holds of 

 all the virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from their conducive- 

 ness to happiness that they come to be classed as virtues." 



The welfare of society as a whole is regarded as the first problem, 

 but not as the final object, being preparatory to the furthering of indi- 

 vidual life and welfare, which is to be compassed by the fostering of 

 social interests. The subjection of personal to social welfare is re- 

 garded as a temporary consequence of the existence of antagonistic 

 societies ; and, when the social aggregate, arrived at a certain ele- 

 vation of development, shall no longer be in danger, the welfare 



