256 NATURAL SCIENCE. Oct., 



" Philosophy," without any change of method, has probably been the 

 cause of some confusion as to what " Philosophy " is ; and to define 

 its relation to Science was, in fact, the motive for giving it as the 

 subject of the prize essay, and the incentive to the thoughts of which 

 this paper is the outcome- 

 It might be said that if philosophic authors appear less precise, 

 and possibly more bold, in their inferences, they are freer from 

 certain prejudices. No "battle" should have been required over 

 evolution surely, in order to introduce it to the scientific world. 

 Evolution teaches no more than that facts take place in accordance 

 with natural causes. There is no supposition of supernatural inter- 

 ference in order to maintain the theory of gravitation or the move- 

 ments of the planets, even if Kepler conjectured something of the kind. 

 Why, then, suppose supernatural interference in molecular movements, 

 or in connection with evolutionary phenomena ? Here experiment is 

 obviously not excluded ; the evolutionary changes converting wild 

 animals into domestic ones have been produced by ourselves. Why 

 imagine, then, that the effects generally classed under evolution 

 should be exceptional, in the respect of possibly deviating from the 

 laws of nature ? 



Some of the scientifically cultured may be unacquainted with 

 Hume's investigation concerning the limits of scientific enquiry, 

 developed with greater precision in Mr. Spencer's analysis respecting 

 the question of origin and the mystery surrounding the universe 

 (" First Principles," pp. 30-36). The researches of philosophy are 

 certainly an excellent school for the elimination of any (possibly 

 partly inherited) bias, which physics, chemistry, or analogous studies 

 would leave untouched. It will probably be conceded that some 

 philosophical Reviews (or "Addresses ") have not been without service 

 in this direction. 



The late Professor von Helmholtz once observed that in some 

 respects the modern telescope surpasses the eye in optical qualities. 

 To endorse this does not necessarily imply that the adaptation of the 

 eye is unfitted for its purpose. Nevertheless, it is possible to under- 

 stand how art can occasionally surpass nature, especially when 

 science and art combine, they being, in the case of the telescope, the 

 natural product of an unbroken process of evolution — where the 

 evolution of the human brain was a preliminary stage. The 

 telescope, therefore, represents a super-organic product, a secondary 

 or more advanced stage of the evolutionary procedure. Conse- 

 quently, it appears that a superior refinement in some directions may 

 be expected, where the eye itself might be left behind. 



Super-organic evolution seems to be of some importance as an 

 idea, since nature, depreciated by ignoring this point of view, may 

 thereby come to be esteemed in a higher degree. By the conception 

 of super-organic evolution, we realise, for instance, how the great 

 achievements of science, art of various kinds, poetry, music, etc., 



