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POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



school in Britain and the United States 

 dates, is always welcome. And, even if 

 scientific students lay up old scores 

 against him for his attack on Huxley, 

 and for his more recent, suggestive, 

 though unfair assault on the Darwin- 

 ians, they must remember that he rep- 

 resents one type of contemporary think- 

 ing favored by a large and influential 

 group; they must remember, too, that 

 he was trained as a physician and has 

 competent first-hand knowledge of the 

 scientific standpoint. The present 

 work — 'What Is Thought,' published by 

 the Blacks in Edinburgh, and imported 

 by the Scribners — although highly 

 metaphysical, in the Hegelian sense, 

 contains not a little interesting material. 

 The early chapters, on 'Substance,' the 

 'Ontological Proof,' 'Self-consciousness,' 

 and the like, summarize views familiar 

 to philosophical students, and known 

 more or less to scientific men through 

 such books as Prof. Ritchie's 'Darwin 

 and Hegel,' and Prof. Watson's 'Kant 

 and his English Critics.' Fortunately, 

 these chapters occupy but a third of 

 the volume. The three hundred pages de- 

 voted to some account of the develop- 

 ment from Kant, through Fichte and 

 Schelling, to Hegel, are more important, 

 and present, in some aspects, the best 

 statement of the subject at present 

 available in English. The long chapter 

 on Kant is full of points demanding 

 consideration from thoughtful scientific 

 workers; while the estimate of the re- 

 lations between Sehelling and Heerel 

 must be held of exceptional value. No 

 doubt, the book is hard reading; all 

 Dr. Sterling's works are, for he has 

 never been able to rid himself of the 

 curious Carlylese style that so strongly 

 marked his first, and greatest, effort. 

 Nevertheless, all the old vigor and all 

 the power remain. It may be added 

 that the book appeals very specially 

 to students of the history of European 



thought in the nineteenth century a 



subject which, particularly as concerns 

 the relation between the sciences and 

 philosophy, is very far from being un- 

 derstood as yet. 



It is not easy to speak of the Eng- 

 lish translation from the German ver- 

 sion of the Danish original of Hoff- 

 ding's 'History of Philosophy.' Pro- 

 fessor Hciffding's work is admirable, as 

 all know; the translation — well, the 

 less said of it, the better. We dismiss it 

 with but one comment. The most laugh- 

 able of the translator's numerous errors 

 happens to be venial, as too many 

 others are not. He tells us that 

 Geulincx died at Pesth. Knowing of 

 the Dutch philosopher's sojourn in 

 Lyons, but being in ignorance of a visit 

 to Pesth, one naturally turned to the 

 original, and found Hoffding record- 

 ing that Geulincx died of the 

 plague (pest) ! This is fit companion 

 for the similar error (now classical) 

 whereby the Wolffian psychology (wolf- 

 fischen PsycJwlogie) was Englished as 

 animal psychology. Pest and Pesth 

 obviously bear much the same relation 

 to each other as Wolff and wolf! This 

 may be sublime, it is hardly translation. 

 One may venture to express a hope that 

 the publishers will see to a thorough re- 

 vision by a competent hand. The work 

 is far too important to be left thus; 

 moreover, we are unaccustomed to as- 

 sociate such a performance with the 

 house of Macmillan. As compared with 

 other histories of philosophy, Hoffding's 

 possesses quite peculiar attractions for 

 those whose main interests lie in the 

 direction of science. The space at dis- 

 posal compels the briefest statement of 

 these points. In the first place, then, 

 Hoffding devotes great attention to the 

 formation and i7nport of the Renais- 

 sance view of the universe. He bears 

 it specially in mind that this view was 

 evolved as much, if not more, by science 

 than by philosophy. Consequently, Co- 

 pernicus, Galileo and Newton take their 

 places alongside Descartes, Spinoza and 

 Leibnitz. The importance of this method 

 of treatment can hardly be exaggerated 

 to-day. For one of the main problems 

 at the moment is nothing more than a 

 determination of the extent to which 

 'modern thought' is still controlled by 



