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since they do differ so widely, they should be given different names, 

 and we may call upon the determinist to avoid altogether, as other 

 men do, the use of the term 'couldn't help' in the second sense. He 

 may then say, without serious danger of being misunderstood, that the 

 first prisoner at the bar couldn't help doing what he did, but that the 

 second could have helped doing it if he had so elected. Without doing 

 violence to the common use of speech, nay, strictly in accordance with 

 common usage, he may declare that the one man was not free, but was 

 under compulsion, while, on the other hand, the second man was free. 

 He may very well do this without ceasing to be an out-and-out deter- 

 minist. 



Before going on with the topic which is the main interest of this 

 paper, it is right that I should say just a word as to what determinism 

 does not imply, it does not imply that all the causes which may be 

 assumed to be the antecedents of human actions are material causes. A 

 determinist may be a materialist, or he may be an idealist, or he may 

 be a composite creature. As a matter of fact, there have been deter- 

 minists of many different kinds, for the dispute touching the human 

 will is thousands of years old; and the fact that the doctrine happens 

 at the present time to be more closely associated in our minds with one 

 of the 'isms' ] have mentioned than with another, says little as to 

 their natural relationship. Nor need the determinist necessarily be 

 either an atheist, a theist, or an agnostic. He may, of course, be any one 

 of these; but if he is, it will not be because of his determinism. As a 

 determinist he affirms only the universal applicability of the principle 

 of sufficient reason — the doctrine that for every occurrence, of what- 

 ever sort, there must be a cause or causes which can furnish an adequate 

 explanation of the occurrence. I say so much to clear the ground. It 

 is well to remember that materialists have been determinists, idealists 

 have been determinists, atheists have been determinists, theologians 

 have been determinists. The doctrine is not bound up with any of the 

 differences that divide these, and it should not be prejudged from a 

 mistaken notion that it necessarily favors the position taken by one of 

 these classes rather than that taken by another. We may approach it 

 with an open mind, and make an effort to judge it strictly on its own 

 merits. 



But to judge it on its own merits, the very first requisite is to purge 

 the mind completely of the misconception that the 'freedom' of 

 the will, or indeterminism, has anything whatever to do with freedom 

 in the ordinary sense of the word — freedom from external compulsion. 

 Here I sit at my desk; my hand lies on the paper before me; can I raise 

 it from the paper or not, just as T please? To such a question, both 

 determinist and indeterminist must give the same answer. Of course 

 I can raise it or not, as I please. Both must admit that I am free in 



