190 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



ardent 'free-willist' will, when he contemplates it frankly, excuse me 

 for hoping that, if I am 'free/ I am at least not very 'free,' and that I 

 may reasonably expect to find some degree of consistency in my life and 

 actions. An excess of such 'freedom' is indistinguishable from the most 

 abject slavery to lawless caprice. 



And when I consider my relations to my fellow-men the outlook is 

 no better. It is often said that the determinist may grant rewards or 

 inflict punishments as a means of attaining certain desired ends, but 

 that for him there can in all this be no question of justice or injustice. 

 One man is by nature prone to evil as the sparks fly upward; another 

 is born an embryo saint. One is ushered into this world, if not 'trailing 

 clouds of glory,' yet with such clouds, in the shape of civilizing in- 

 fluences, hovering about the very cradle in which he is to lie; another 

 opens his eyes upon a light which breaks feebly through the foul and 

 darkened window-pane, and which is lurid with the reflections of 

 degradation and vice. One becomes the favorite of fortune, and the 

 other the unhappy subject of painful correction. Unless there be 

 'free-will,' where can we find even the shadow of justice in our treat- 

 ment of these? We have all heard the argument at length, and I shall 

 not enter into it further; nor shall I delay over the question of the true 

 meaning of the terms justice and injustice, though this meaning is often 

 taken for granted in a very heedless way. I shall merely inquire 

 whether the assumption of 'freedom' contributes anything toward the 

 solution of the problem of punishment. 



Let us suppose that Tommy's mother is applying a slipper to some 

 portion of his frame for having 'freely* raided the pantry. Does she 

 punish him for having done the deed, or does she punish him to prevent 

 its recurrence? In either case, she seems, if the deed was a 'free' one, 

 to be acting in a wholly unreasonable way. Was the deed really done by 

 Tommy — i. e., was it the natural result of his knowledge of the con- 

 tents of the pantry, his appetite for jam, and the presence of the key in 

 the door? Not at all. The act was a 'free T one, and not conditioned 

 by either Tommj-'s character or his environment. The child's grand- 

 father might have 'freely' stolen jam under just the same circum- 

 stances. Thus, in a true sense of the words, the child did not do it. 

 Who can cause what is causeless? Moreover, by no possibility could 

 he have prevented it. Who can guard against the spontaneity of 'free- 

 dom'? No resolve, as we have seen, can condition the unconditioned. 

 Then why beat the poor child for what he did not do and what he could 

 not possibly have prevented? Surely this is wanton cruelty, and worthy 

 of all reprobation! 



Is the punishment intended to prevent a recurrence of the deed? 

 How futile a measure! Does the silly woman actually believe that she 

 (•an with a slipper make such changes in Tommy's mind or body as to 



