PEARSON'S GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. 297 



society the same principles that Darwin applied to breeds. A family 

 in which the standards of that society are not traditional will go under 

 and die out, and thus 'social stability' tends to be maintained. 



But against the doctrine that social stability is the sole justification 

 of scientific research, whether this doctrine be adulterated or not with 

 the utilitarian clause, I have to object, first, that it is historically false, 

 in that it does not accord with the predominant sentiment of scientific 

 men; second, that it is bad ethics; and, third, that its propagation 

 would retard the progress of science. 



Professor Pearson does not, indeed, pretend that that which effectu- 

 ally animates the labors of scientific men is any desire 'to strengthen 

 social stability.' Such a proposition would be too grotesque. Yet if 

 it was his business, in treating of the grammar of science, to set forth the 

 legitimate motive to research — as he has deemed it to be — it was cer- 

 tainly also his business, especially in view of the splendid successes of 

 science, to show what has, in fact, moved such men. They have, at 

 all events, not been inspired by a wish either to 'support social stability' 

 or, in the main, to increase the sum of men's pleasures. The man of 

 science has received a deep impression of the majesty of truth, as that 

 to which, sooner or later, every knee must bow. He has further found 

 that his own mind is sufficiently akin to that truth, to enable him, on 

 condition of submissive observation, to interpret it in some measure. 

 As he gradually becomes better and better acquainted with the char- 

 acter of cosmical truth, and learns that human reason is its issue and 

 can be brought step by step into accord with it, he conceives a passion 

 for its fuller revelation. He is keenly aware of his own ignorance, and 

 knows that personally he can make but small steps in discovery. Yet, 

 small as they are, he deems them precious; and he hopes that by con- 

 scientiously pursuing the methods of science he may erect a foundation 

 upon which his successors may climb higher. This, for him, is what 

 makes life worth living and what makes the human race worth perpetu- 

 ation. The very being of law, general truth, reason — call it what you 

 will — consists in its expressing itself in a cosmos and in intellects which 

 reflect it, and in doing this progressively; and that which makes pro- 

 gressive creation worth doing — so the researcher comes to feel — is pre- 

 cisely the reason, the law, the general truth for the sake of which it 

 takes place. 



Such, I believe, as a matter of fact, is the motive which effectually 

 works in the man of science. That granted, we have next to inquire 

 which motive is the more rational, the one just described or that which 

 Professor Pearson recommends. The ethical text-books offer us classi- 

 fications of human motives. But for our present purpose it will suffice 

 to pass in rapid review some of the more prominent ethical classes of 

 motives. 



