300 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



the few theoretical motives which has unquestionably had an extremely 

 beneficial influence. But the greatest happiness of the greatest num- 

 ber, as expounded by Bentham, resolves itself into merely superin- 

 ducing the quality of pleasure upon men's immediate feelings. Now, 

 if the pursuit of pleasure is not a satisfactory ultimate motive for me, 

 why should I enslave myself to procuring it for others? Leslie 

 Stephen's book was far from uttering the last word upon ethics; but it 

 is difficult to comprehend how anybody who has read it reflectively can 

 continue to hold the mixed doctrine that no action is to be encour- 

 aged for any other reason than that it either tends to the stability of 

 society or to general happiness. 



Ethics, as such, is extraneous to a Grammar of Science; but it is a 

 serious fault in such a book to inculcate reasons for scientific research 

 the acceptance of which must tend to lower the character of such 

 research. Science is, upon the whole, at present in a very healthy 

 condition. It would not remain so if the motives of scientific men 

 were lowered. The worst feature of the present state of things is that 

 the great majority of the members of many scientific societies, and a 

 large part of others, are men whose chief interest in science is as a 

 means of gaining money, and who have a contempt, or half-contempt, 

 for pure science. Now, to declare that the sole reason for scientific 

 research is the good of society is to encourage those pseudo-scientists 

 to claim, and the general public to admit, that they, who deal with 

 the applications of knowledge, are the true men of science, and that 

 the theoreticians are little better than idlers. 



In Chapter II., entitled 'The Facts of Science,' we find that the 

 'stability of society' is not only to regulate our conduct, but, also, that 

 our opinions have to be squared to it. In section 10 we are told that 

 we must not believe a certain purely theoretical proposition because it is 

 'anti-social' to do so, and because to do so 'is opposed to the interests of 

 society.' As to the 'canons of legitimate inference' themselves, that are 

 laid down by Professor Pearson, I have no great objection to them. They 

 certainly involve important truths. They are excessively vague and capa- 

 ble of being twisted to support illogical opinions, as they are twisted by 

 their author, and they leave much groimd uncovered. But I will not 

 pursue these objections. I do say, however, that truth is truth, whether 

 it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it or not — and that the 

 notion that we must deny what it is not conducive to the stability of 

 British society to affirm is the mainspring of the mendacity and hypoc- 

 risy which Englishmen so commonly regard as virtues. I must confess 

 that I belong to that class of scallawags who purpose, with God's help, 

 to look the truth in the face, whether doing so be conducive to the 

 interests of society or not. Moreover, if I should ever attack that exces- 

 sively difficult problem, 'What is for the true interest of society?' I 



