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POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWL- 

 EDGE. 



Little doubt can exist longer that 

 the coolness which marked the relation- 

 ship between Science and Philosophy 

 from about 1840 until within the last 

 decade is passing away rapidly. 

 Thanks partly to the development of 

 experimental psychology, partly to the 

 broader training given at our colleges, 

 where science has won a recognized 

 place in the undergraduate course, the 

 younger men who specialize in philoso- 

 phy possess some acquaintance with the 

 scientific attitude and temper. To 

 them, and to the professed votary of 

 science, the new work, entitled 'Founda- 

 tions of Knowledge,' by Professor Or- 

 mond, of Princeton (Macmillan), can 

 not fail to present some attractive and 

 some curious considerations. In wit- 

 ness of his sympathy with the modern 

 outlook, and to a certain extent under 

 pressure of its demands, the 'McCosh 

 Professor,' of all people, has striven 

 hard to adopt an experiential basis. 

 He sees quite clearly that neither the 

 hide-bound empiricism of the tradi- 

 tional English school, nor the vaulting 

 a priori dialectic of Hegel and his Eng- 

 lish-speaking derivants, suffice to phil- 

 osophical salvation at present. Accord- 

 ingly, he has provided a sober, straight- 

 forward analysis of the implications 

 hidden under such terms as Experience, 

 Knowledge, Reality. This forms the 

 First Part of his essay. Having thus 

 expelled traditional subjects of conten- 

 tion, he proceeds to consider the various 

 characteristic ways in which knowledge 

 grows from a less to a more complex 

 synthesis of things. In this connection, 

 he deals with the same material upon 

 which metaphysicians have racked their 

 brains time out of mind — Space, Time, 

 Quantity, Quality, Cause, Substance, 



taking the stage successively. And it 

 must be said that, although Professor 

 Ormond's style is a trifle heavy, he con- 

 trives to set forth some sensible, fresh 

 and, moreover, plain conclusions. But, 

 as has been hinted, these matters are 

 ancient history with all philosophers, 

 as with some scientific workers. And 

 so, this Second Part of the work does 

 not stop here. As many are aware, the 

 ideas just mentioned may be called 

 static; and the modern tendency — very 

 strong in science, equally strong with 

 the younger philosophical men — makes 

 its presence felt in Professor Ormond's 

 discussion of dynamic aspects of experi- 

 ence. The conception of a social mind, 

 leading to the ideas of relationship, in- 

 terdependence and unitary mental life 

 expressing itself in individuals, has at- 

 tracted his close attention. It can hardly 

 be said that he has embraced all the con- 

 clusions to which such conceptions lead 

 necessarily. He makes reservations, or 

 rather, the habit of his mind and the 

 influences of his education induce him 

 to stop short midway in his progress. 

 Consequently, it turns out, in the Third 

 Part of the book, that human experi- 

 ence possesses a 'transcendent or super- 

 ordinary element.' Here, it seems, phi- 

 losophy finds its peculiar work, while 

 science deals with the ordinary or rela- 

 tive. Even a superficial acquaintance 

 with the history of thought reminds us 

 that this is a very old idea; one, too, 

 which, like other old ideas, has been 

 petarded often. But Professor Ormond 

 presents it in a fresh way, and in as 

 reasonable fashion as it is capable of 

 assuming. Not that he justifies it, for 

 it cannot be justified, except by Deity. 

 At the same time, through its instru- 

 mentality he calls attention to one 

 aspect of knowledge that has been sub- 

 ject to neglect of late. From this brief 



