ioo POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



tion bearing on the increase or diffusion of knowledge is still as cor- 

 dially welcome and as appropriately delivered before our Society as in 

 the former time. It was frequently observed by the older members 

 that among the benefits which they derived from our meetings none 

 was greater than the opportunity of each to learn from the lips of a 

 competent associate the conclusions formed in lines of research other- 

 wise unfamiliar to the listener. Thus the mental horizon of each was 

 broadened and the capacity for wider generalization and more philo- 

 sophic views was duly enlarged. 



As, by the operation of the causes already alluded to, the member- 

 ship of the society has come to be devoted to fewer lines of research, it 

 has still been possible to preserve our reputation for catholicity in 

 science and its beneficial consequences, by calling from time to time 

 on those eminent in particular branches, who may not be members 

 of our body, to favor us with some account of the researches to which 

 they are devoted, or of the present state of opinion as to the progress 

 actually made. 



To-night is one of those occasions ; and I feel that I am only voi- 

 cing the unuttered sentiments of all our members when I express our 

 cordial appreciation of the courtesy our guests have shown us in their 

 willingness to contribute to our program. 



In considering the general subject of the evening, I was led to 

 look up the definitions of science and law, as such, in the oldest avail- 

 able dictionaries of our language. The earliest noted is that of 

 Phillips, in 1720, who tells us that science is 'knowledge founded upon 

 or gained by certain clear and self-evident principles,' and Bailey, in 

 1737, holds it to be 'a framed system of any branch of knowledge com- 

 prehending the doctrine, reason or theory of the thing, without any 

 immediate application of it to any uses or offices of life.' A study of 

 other and subsequent definitions shows that the early lexicographers 

 at least regarded science as a theoretical system divorced from practice. 



Law, on the other hand, appears to have been regarded chiefly as a 

 rule or measure imposed by some external authority on the subject of 

 it. While the words used in defining these entities may have a modern 

 meaning injected into them, it is practically certain that the minds 

 which framed these definitions possessed no such comprehension of 

 them. 



For oar purposes science is: exact knowledge of facts and their 

 inter-relations, and, by an extension common to the language, the 

 methods used in attaining this knowledge and the systematic state- 

 ment of it when attained are included under the same name. 



No better definition of law than that of Blackstone appears any- 

 where. He calls 'A rule of action.' We now amplify this definition 

 by discriminating under the single name two classes of law, namely, 



