TEE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 291 



nomena of the inanimate or physical, and of the living world are funda- 

 mentally identical? The progress of physiological science has greatly 

 increased the impetus towards the adoption of this thought as the car- 

 dinal dogma of the new faith, because the work of physiologists has 

 been so devoted to the physical and chemical phenomena of life, that 

 the conviction is widespread that all vital phenomena are capable of 

 a physical explanation. Assuming that conviction to be correct, it is 

 easy to draw the final conclusion that the physical explanation suffices 

 for the entire universe. As to what is, or may be, behind the physical 

 explanation, complete agnosticism is of course the only possible atti- 

 tude. Such in barest — but I believe correct — outline is the history of 

 modern monism — the doctrine that there is but one kind of power in 

 the universe. 



It is evident that monism involves the elimination of two concepts, 

 God and consciousness. It is true that monists sometimes use these 

 words, but it is mere jugglery, for they deny the concept for which the 

 words actually stand. Now, consciousness is too familiar to all men 

 to be summarily cast aside and dismissed. Some way must be found 

 to account for it. From the monistic standpoint there is a choice be- 

 tween two possible alternatives ; either consciousness is a form of energy, 

 like heat, etc., or it is merely a so-called epiphenomenon. As there 

 is no evidence that consciousness is a form of energy, only the second 

 alternative is in reality available, and in fact has been adopted by the 

 monists. 



It is essential to have a clear notion of what is meant by an epiphe- 

 nomenon. Etymologically the word indicates something which is super- 

 imposed upon the actual phenomenon. It designates an accompanying 

 incident of a process which is assumed to have no causal relation to 

 the further development of the process. In practice it is used chiefly 

 in regard to the relation of the mind or consciousness to the body, and 

 is commonly employed by those philosophers who believe that conscious- 

 ness has no causal relation to any subsequent physiological process. 



For many years I have tried to recognize some actual idea under- 

 neath the epiphenomenon hypothesis of consciousness, but it more and 

 more seems clear to me that there is no idea at all, and that the hypoth- 

 esis is an empty phrase, a subterfuge, which really amounts only to 

 this — we can explain consciousness very easily by merely assuming 

 that it does not require to be explained at all. Is not that really the 

 confession made by the famous assertion that the consciousness of the 

 brain no more requires explanation than the aquosity of water? 



Monism is not a strong system of philosophy, for it is not so much 

 the product of deep and original thinking as the result of a contem- 

 porary tendency. It is not the inevitable end of a logical process, 

 because it omits consciousness, but rather an incidental result of an 



