THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 293 



We must begin by accepting the direct evidence of our own con- 

 sciousness as furnishing the basis. We must further accept the evi- 

 dence that consciousness exists in other men essentially identical with 

 the consciousness in each of us. The anatomical, physiological and 

 psychological evidence of the identity of the phenomena in different 

 human individuals is, to a scientific mind, absolutely conclusive, even 

 though we continue to admit cheerfully that the epistemologist rightly 

 asserts that no knowledge is absolute, and that the metaphysician 

 rightly claims that ego is the only reality and everything else exists 

 only as ego's idea, because in science as in practical life we assume that 

 our knowledge is real and is objective in source. 



For the purpose of the following discussion we must define certain 

 qualities or characteristics of consciousness. The most striking distinc- 

 tion of the processes in living bodies, as compared with those in 

 inanimate bodies, is that the living processes have an object — they are 

 teleological. The distinction is so conspicuous that the biologists can 

 very often say why a given structure exists, or why a given function is 

 performed, but how the structure exists or how the function is per- 

 formed he can tell very imperfectly, more often not at all. Conscious- 

 ness is only a particular example, though an excellent one, of this 

 peculiarity of biological knowledge — we do not know what it is, we 

 do not know how it functions, but we do know why it exists. Those 

 who are baffled by the elusiveness of consciousness when we attempt 

 to analyze it will do well to remember that all other vital phenomena 

 are in the last instance equally and similarly elusive. 



In order to determine the teleological value of consciousness, we 

 must endeavor to make clear to ourselves what the essential function 

 is which it performs. As I have found no description or statement 

 of that function which satisfied me, I have ventured, perhaps rashly, 

 to draw up the following new description : 



The function of consciousness is to dislocate in time the reactions 

 from sensations. 



In one sense this may be called a definition of consciousness, but 

 inasmuch as it does not tell what consciousness is, but only what it does, 

 we have not a true definition, but a description of a function. The 

 description itself calls for a brief explanation. We receive constantly 

 numerous sensations, and in response to these we do many things. 

 These doings are, comprehensively speaking, our reactions to our sen- 

 sations. When the response to a stimulus is obviously direct and imme- 

 diate we call the response a reflex action, but a very large share of our 

 actions are not reflex but are determined in a far more complicated 

 manner by the intervention of consciousness, which may do one of 

 two things: (1) Stop a reaction, as, for example, when something 

 occurs, calling, as it were, for our attention and we do not give our 



