298 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



functions of the spinal cord, which in mammals is devoted to reflex 

 actions. Its verification is further suggested by the natural history of 

 habits. As we all know, new actions are performed with difficulty and 

 slowly, but if often repeated they are soon easier and more rapid. If 

 a given reaction to a sensation or group of sensations through con- 

 sciousness is advantageous to the organism and the environment is such 

 that the sensation is often repeated, then a habit is formed and the 

 response becomes more rapid, and often in ourselves we see habits 

 which arose from conscious action working almost without the partici- 

 pation of consciousness, and moreover working usefully because rapidly. 

 The usefulness of conscious reactions is that they are determined not 

 merely by the present sensation but also by past sensations, but they 

 have the defect that they are slow. We can readily understand that it 

 would aid an organism to have the quicker reaction substituted, and we 

 thus recognize a valid teleological reason for the replacement of con- 

 scious action by habits in the individual, by instincts in the race. The 

 investigation of the evolution of reflexes and instincts is one of the 

 important and most promising tasks of comparative psychology. 



A frank unbiased study of consciousness must convince every biol- 

 ogist that it is one of the fundamental phenomena of at least animal 

 life, if not, as is quite possible, of all life. Nevertheless its considera- 

 tion has barely a place in biological science, although it has long occu- 

 pied a vast place in philosophy and metaphysics. If this address shall 

 contribute to a clearer appreciation of the necessity of treating con- 

 sciousness as primarily a problem for biological research to solve, my 

 purpose will be achieved. In an ideal world philosophers and scientists 

 would be identical; in the actual world there are philosophical scien- 

 tists and scientific philosophers, but in the main the followers of the 

 two disciplines pursue paths which are unfortunately distinct. The 

 philosophical mind is of a type unlike the scientific. The former tries 

 to progress primarily by thought based on the data available, the latter 

 seeks to advance primarily by collecting additional data. The conse- 

 quence of this difference is that philosophy is dependent upon the 

 progress of science, but we who pursue the scientific way make no 

 greater mistake than to underestimate philosophy. The warning is 

 needed. Data of observation are a treasure and very precious. They 

 are the foundation of our mental wealth, but that wealth consists of 

 the thought into which the data are transmitted. In pleading there- 

 fore for an increased observational study of consciousness we plead, 

 not merely for science, but equally for philosophy. The scientific 

 progress must come first. Hence we urge the advantage of investiga- 

 ting consciousness in its immediate revelations which are accessible now. 

 Let us give up the ineffectual struggle to discover the essential nature 



