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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



passed from one method of thought to an- 

 other by slow processes of intellectual growth 

 which required time as well as exertion, and 

 he has pushed further on in the scientific 

 direction and away from the metaphysical 

 position than perhaps any other writer. How 

 complete has been the revolution in his own 

 mind is well illustrated by a passage in his 

 preface referring to his former work. 



He says : " I deem it important to have 

 it understood at the outset, that this trea- 

 tise is in no sense a further exposition of 

 the doctrines of a book ('The Philosophy of 

 Nature' Boston: Crosby & Nichols, 1848) 

 which I published more than a third of a 

 century ago. That book was written while 

 I was under the spell of Hegel's ontological 

 reveries at a time when I was barely of 

 age, and still seriously affected with the 

 metaphysical malady which seems to be one 

 of the unavoidable disorders of intellectual 

 infancy. The labor expended in writing it 

 was not, perhaps, wholly wasted, and there 

 are things in it of which I am not ashamed, 

 even at this day. Cut I sincerely regret its 

 publication, which is in some degree atoned 

 for, I hope, by the contents of the present 

 volume." 



Having slowly recovered from his seri- 

 ous Hegelian attack and mastered in a very 

 thorough manner the principles and methods 

 of modern physical science, it was inevita- 

 ble that Judge Stallo's attention should be 

 forcibly drawn to the relations of these two 

 systems, and to the question how far science 

 is still dominated by the old metaphysical 

 method. It is his opinion that the meta- 

 physical influence lingers and rules in sci- 

 entific thought to a greater degree than is 

 commonly suspected. It is generally sup- 

 posed that physical science, at any rate, has 

 quite freed itself from the mischievous ten- 

 dencies of metaphysical speculation, and that 

 Newton's admonition to the physicists, " to 

 l>iv are of metaphysics," has been so effectu- 

 ally heeded that this branch of investigation 

 may be taken as illustrating the true sci- 

 entific method in its purity and perfection. 

 The author of the "Concepts and Theories 

 of Modern Physics" holds that this assump- 

 tion is but partially true, and the present 

 work is devoted to a comprehensive exam- 

 ination of what may be regarded as basal 

 theories of physics, to the evidence that 



may be given of their errors, and to tracing 

 out the metaphysical origin of these errors. 

 We can not here do better than to restate his 

 position as given by himself in the preface 

 to his book : "It will be seen at once, upon 

 a most cursory glance at any one of the 

 chapters of this little book, that it is in no 

 wise intended as an open or covert advocacy 

 of a return to metaphysical methods and 

 aims ; but that, on the contrary, its tenden- 

 cy is throughout to eliminate from science 

 its latent metaphysical elements, to foster 

 and not to repress the spirit of experimental 

 investigation, and to accredit instead of dis- 

 crediting the great endeavor of scientific 

 research to gain a sure foothold on solid, 

 empirical ground, where the real data of 

 experience may be reduced without ontolog- 

 ical prepossessions. An attentive perusal 

 of these pages will make it clear, I think, 

 that this endeavor is continually thwarted 

 by the insidious intrusion into the medita- 

 tions of the man of science of the old meta- 

 physical spirit. This fact having been es- 

 tablished, it was incumbent on me to ascer- 

 tain, if possible, its causes and, within the 

 narrow limits at my command, to develop 

 its consequences.". 



The first or introductory chapter of Judge 

 Stallo's book is devoted to a statement of 

 those theoretical ideas which are main- 

 tained to be fundamental in physical science. 

 These involve the mechanical conception of 

 the constitution of matter, or the atomo- 

 molecular theory. A large number of the 

 most authoritative writers are quoted, who 

 agree that, in the language of Du Bois-Rey- 

 mond, "the resolution of all changes in the 

 material world into motions of atoms, caused 

 by their constant central forces, would be 

 the completion of natural science." The 

 author sums up the doctrine as follows : 

 " The mechanical theory of the universe 

 undertakes to account for all physical phe- 

 nomena by describing them as variances in 

 the structure or configuration of material 

 systems. It strives to apprehend all phe- 

 nomenal diversities in the material world 

 as varieties in the grouping of primordial 

 units of mass, to recognize all phenomenal 

 changes as movements of unchangeable ele- 

 ments, and thus to exhibit all apparent 

 qualitative heterogeneity as mere quantita- 

 tive difference." 



