MATERIALISM AND POSITIVISM. 615 



MATERIALISM AND POSITIVISM. 



By W. D. LE SUEUR. 



MATERIALISTS and positivists are commonly classed together 

 by those who have never well understood what either material- 

 ism or positivism really is. Positivism is supposed to be materialistic 

 because it fails to call in spiritual existences in explanation of phe- 

 nomena because, in other words, it stops short at facts, and does not 

 seek to search out ultimate causes. The people who draw this infer- 

 ence take for granted, apparently, in their ordinary thinkings, that all 

 facts must be facts of matter, and that those who confine themselves 

 to facts must consequently be materialists. There is, therefore, really 

 a fundamental materialism in the very criticism that fastens upon 

 positivism the chai-ge of materialism. Let us, however, look a little 

 more closely into materialism considered as a mode of philosophical 

 belief. 



What do we mean by matter? First of all, it is obvious that we 

 mean something that is objective to the mind or thinking faculty 

 something the mind finds upon its path, as it were, and that is the 

 source to it of certain definite impressions. All impressions made upon 

 the mind do not, however, equally connect themselves with the idea 

 of matter. Some, of course, do not so connect themselves at all. When 

 we are struck by the generosity or baseness of an action, or feel the 

 influence of character, or experience the pleasure of harmonious or the 

 pain of discordant relations, our consciousness is in no way concerned 

 with matter. There might be no such thing as matter in the world, 

 for aught we know or care about it at such moments. Yet our im- 

 pressions have the very highest degree of definiteness. But even 

 impressions made directly on our physical senses do not all, with equal 

 force, bring the conception of matter before the mind. The word 

 " phantasm " bears witness that visual impressions do not always con- 

 vey a belief in the existence of the external reality called matter. It 

 means, literally, " an appearance " ; but it has come to mean an ap- 

 pearance void of all substantive reality. There is the same implication 

 when we speak of " rubbing our eyes " to make sure that we see a 

 i thing. The sense of hearing is, in like manner, sometimes distrusted ; 

 and it may be said that, if we lived in a world in which our only knowl- 

 edge of objective existence was through sights and sounds, our idea 

 of matter, if we had one at all, would be very different from what it 

 actually is. There is, however, another sense, the testimony of which 

 is held to be surer than that of any other, the sense of touch. Sight 

 may deceive, hearing may deceive ; but what we can touch and feel 

 is real. Here we find the true basis of the popular idea of matter 

 that which can be felt ; that which resists our muscles. It is true 



