THE MACHINERY OF ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT. 635 



Executive Council always in sufficient harmony with the Legislature. 

 But the Legislature and the Executive would be set free each of them 

 to perform its proper functions. The Legislature would no longer be 

 hampered by the fear of overturning the Executive ; the Executive 

 would be stable, and would discharge the duties of administration and 

 police steadily and without fear about its own existence. At present 

 in France, executive government, the sport of factions and of sections 

 of factions, is utterly unstable, and can hardly assure the necessary 

 protection to the citizen, much less engage his full confidence and his 

 hearty allegiance. No longer would half or more than half the public 

 men of the country be employed in propagating discontent, or a moiety 

 of the nation be in a state of moral insurrection against the govern- 

 ment which ought to be the object of its united loyalty and support. 

 It is true that the criticism of an organized opposition would be with- 

 drawn, but that criticism is always passionate and unjust ; it is, in 

 fact, not criticism but attack ; and the fullest opportunity of fair criti- 

 cism in an open Legislature would remain. Of the bribery, whether 

 coarse or refined, which is now employed to hold together a following, 

 there would be no need, the tenure of office being secured by law. 

 Under such a system evil motives and influences would not be ex- 

 cluded; they can not be excluded from any system founded on human 

 nature ; but they would not be an inseparable part of the polity, and 

 their sway would be diminished by every improvement in the political 

 character of the nation. 



Responsibility would not be impaired, inasmuch as an office would 

 be intrusted to each minister only for a term, after which he would 

 have to answer for his conduct, while the Legislature would retain the 

 power of censure, and in extreme cases of impeachment and removal. 

 There would be no majority to vote black white under a false sense of 

 honor for the purpose of shielding a criminal of its own party. The 

 election of the Executive by the Legislature is the natural application 

 of the elective principle of government. Nor can it be said to be 

 wholly novel. It has been tried in Switzerland, though it is true that 

 Switzerland being not merely a nation with a federal structure like 

 the United States, but a union of really different elements, German, 

 French, and Italian, her case is peculiar, and her example must be 

 used with caution. It may be said to exist, though in an irregular 

 and objectionable shape, in England, since the ministry is virtually 

 designated by the vote of the House of Commons. 



Another advantage of the regular election by the Legislature to 

 the offices of Government might be the choice of ministers with ref- 

 erence to their departmental aptitudes, in place of the pitchforking 

 system which the necessity of finding places for all the leaders at 

 present entails. Nor need there be much fear of want of sufficient 

 harmony in a board which would have common administrative du- 

 ties, common pride in their successful performance, and the union 



